Campbell University School of Law

Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Mapping Inter-Organizational Boundary Bureaucracy and the Need
for Oversight
Bobbi Jo Boyd

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/fac_sw

MAPPING INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL
BOUNDARY BUREAUCRACY AND THE
NEED FOR OVERSIGHT
Bobbi Jo Boyd**
The traditionalparadigm of state andfederal government envisions a
neat separation between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches
and between the public and private sectors. The heart of this Article
explores the reality that some government agencies-particularlystate
agencies-have ambiguous and contested branch assignments and blurred
hierarchicalrelationships with the private sector, and even other state
agencies. When bureaucraticboundaries are blurred and ambiguous, an
agency can become unhinged from laws that mandate transparency and
accountability to the public it serves.
This Article examines two state agencies-the North Carolina State
Bar and the Board of Law Examiners-as examples of a regulatory model
where autonomy and self-regulation are predominantfeatures. Drawing
upon originalarchival research, the Article traces how branch assignment
ambiguity and self-regulationallowed each agency to driftfrom its original
statutory mandate and evolve in unanticipated, and sometimes problematic,
ways.
After charting some of the negative effects of the way the agencies
operate-including the Board of Law Examiners' decades-longfailure to
engage in public rulemaking-the Article argues that the state legislature
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should clarify the relationships and duties of these agencies, the
government branch to which they belong, and whether both agencies must
meet certain minimum requirements of public participation. This case
study is instructivefor jurisdictionsregulatingoccupations and professions
through autonomous regulatory models, particularly for jurisdictions
seeking to make an informed response to the Supreme Court's federal
antitrust law decision in North CarolinaState Board of Dental Examiners
v. Federal Trade Commission, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
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INTRODUCTION

Executive branch agencies are typically subject to a state's
administrative procedure act,' while legislative and judicial agencies are
often exempt.2 When an agency's government branch assignment is not
clear, threshold questions-like what procedures govern-can remain
unresolved and, over time, be answered in inconsistent ways.3 Juxtaposing
two claims about the North Carolina State Bar's government branch
assignment effectively illustrates the existing ambiguity of branch
assignment identity.
The first claim is found in an interim order issued in LegalZoom.com,
Inc. v. N.C. State Bar.4 In 2011, LegalZoom filed suit against the North
1. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.031 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(la) (2015).
2. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-1(a) (2015); IND. CODE § 4-22-2-3(a) (2015); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 536.010(a) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 183.310(1) (2015); W. VA. CODE § 29A-1-2(a)
(2015).
3. See, e.g., infra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
4. See LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2014 WL 1213242, at
*8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2014); see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, 11 CVS 15111, 2011 WL 8424700 (N.C. Super. Ct. filed
Sept. 30, 2011). Notwithstanding the September 2011 filing of a complaint, the case had yet to
reach the discovery stage by spring 2015. In June 2015, LegalZoom filed a lawsuit against the
North Carolina State Bar in federal court, alleging Sherman Act violations. See Complaint for
Damages and Injunctive Relief-Jury Trial Demanded, LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar,
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Carolina State Bar, alleging the Bar engaged in anti-competitive and unfair
conduct in violation of state law by failing to register LegalZoom's pre-paid
legal services plan, a pre-requisite to offering such services in North
Carolina.' Shortly thereafter, the case was designated a mandatory complex
business case and moved to North Carolina's Business Court, which was
created for the purpose of handling complex litigation matters.6 In March
2014, the Business Court issued a pretrial order and opinion, ruling on
several motions, including LegalZoom's motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings.' Notably, the court denied LegalZoom's motion for want of
subject matter jurisdiction,' concluding that the North Carolina State Bar
was subject to9 North Carolina's Administrative Procedure Act,"o and
presumably, part of the executive branch of government."
No. 1:15-CV-439 (M.D.N.C. filed June 3, 2015). Before year's end, LegalZoom.com and the
North Carolina State Bar requested entry of a consent judgment, which was ordered on October
22, 2015. See LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2015 WL 6441853, at
*1-3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2015).
5. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4; see also 27 N.C. ADMIN.
CODE 01E.0302 (2015) ("Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar") (requiring
registration with the North Carolina State Bar before implementation or operation of a pre-paid
legal services plan).
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-45.3 to -45.4 (2015).
7. See LegalZoom.com, 2014 WL 1213242, at *8.
8. Id. at* 17.
9. Id. at *9. This LegalZoom example is representative of numerous conflicting claims
about the North Carolina's branch assignment. E.g., compare Letter from David S. Crump,
Assoc. Att'y Gen., Admin. Procedures Section, State of N.C. Dep't of Justice, to B.E. James,
Exec. Sec'y, N.C. State Bar 3 (Apr. 15, 1976) [hereinafter Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David
S. Crump to B.E. James] (concluding that the Supreme Court of North Carolina "is not
sufficiently involved with the State Bar to make the Bar an agency of the Court rather than an
agency which exercises its powers pursuant to legislative command, just as any other
administrative agency"), with Letter from Howard A. Kramer, Deputy Att'y Gen. for Legal
Affairs, State of N.C. Dep't of Justice, to B.E. James, Exec. Sec'y, N.C. State Bar (Sept. 1, 1976)
[hereinafter Letter dated Sept. 1, 1976, from Howard A. Kramer to B.E. James] (stating "in our
opinion the North Carolina State Bar is a member of the judicial branch"). Both letters are
contained in this Article's Appendix.
10. The Business Court stated:
The APA . . . conditions judicial review [on] a final agency decision and exhaustion of
administrative remedies . . . . The Act applies to every agency except those specifically
enumerated[, and agency means] an agency .. . in the executive branch of the government of
this state. [North Carolina statutory law further provides:] There is hereby created as an
agency of the state of North Carolina ... the North Carolina State Bar. By this definition, the
State Bar is an agency, and it is not specifically exempted from the APA.
LegalZoom, 2014 WL 1213242, at *8-9, 17.
11. Id. at *8. The court's claim-that the State Bar is an agency within the executive
branch-was based on its reading of two statutes, one from North Carolina's Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and one from the statutory scheme creating the North Carolina State Bar
and the Board of Law Examiners. See id. To locate the Bar within the executive branch, the court
accurately indicated that the APA applies to "every agency except those specifically
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In sharp contrast to this executive branch placement, a letter authored
by the State Bar's executive director and published in the spring 2015 issue
of the North CarolinaState Bar Journalreads:
The State Bar is not an executive branch agency but is an integral part of
the judicial branch of government. . . . Pursuant to statute, the State Bar
performs a judicial function1 2 and is responsible to and supervised by the
Supreme Court. Its status as a judicial agency was first recognized by our
State's attorney general in 1976.1'
How could two unequivocal claims from such authoritative sources be
diametrically opposed? As this Article shows, each claim is simultaneously

enumerated[,]" and that "agency" under the APA "means an agency .. . in the executive branch of
the government of this State." Id. The court then accurately noted that the State Bar was not
specifically exempt from the APA and quoted the General Assembly's agency organic statute:
"There is hereby created as an agency of the State of North Carolina, . . . the North Carolina State
Bar." Id. While the preceding premises are true, the court's claim-that the State Bar is an
agency within the executive branch of government-does not necessarily follow as a matter of
formal logic unless "agency of the state" qualifies as an "agency within the executive branch of
government." See id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-15 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2 (la).
Accordingly, the plain language of these two statutes when read together has failed to provide a
straightforward resolution to whether the State Bar (or the Board of Law Examiners) is subject to
North Carolina's APA. While "agency" is defined inclusively under the APA and applies to
agencies that are included within the executive branch of government, the term has not always
been defined this way. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(1) (Supp. 1974) (defining "agency" in
similar terms, except excluding those "agencies in the legislative or judicial branches of the State
government").
12. The phrases "judicial function" and "judicial act" appear frequently in authorities,
including those cited in this Article. See, e.g., infra note 86 and accompanying text; infra notes
203-204 and accompanying text. But these phrases, as used in various authorities, are neither
consistently nor clearly defined. See, e.g., Caranchini v. Missouri Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 447
S.W.3d 768, 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (stating "[m]any judicial or quasi-judicial 'functions' are
performed routinely by administrative agencies" (quoting State ex rel. Haughey v. Ryan, 81 S.W.
435, 436 (1904))); see also Keenan v. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 n.5
(E.D.N.C. 1970) ("The North Carolina General Assembly ... has delegated its rule making power
to the Board of Law Examiners and has determined that the Board shall also apply its own rules
'to the particular case.' The Board is, therefore, an 'administrative agency,' Baker v. Varser, 240
N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1964), with both judicial and delegated legislative powers."). These
phrases could be referring to acts or functions that emanate from the judicial branch of
government. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. § 3-101(e) (2015) (defining "judicial function" as the
"exercise of any power of the Judicial Branch of the State government"). On the other hand, these
phrases could refer to acts or functions that are of an adjudicatory nature. See, e.g., Turnbull v.
Cty. of Pawnee, 810 N.W.2d 172, 178 (Neb. Ct. App. 2011) (stating a "board or tribunal exercises
a judicial function if it decides a dispute of adjudicative fact or if a statute requires it to act in a
judicial manner").
13. L. Thomas Lunsford II, Lest We Be Misunderstood, N.C. STATE B. J., Spring 2015, at
6-9, 23 (reprinting a letter the State Bar drafted in response to a legislative report finding that
more oversight was needed for the state's occupational licensing agencies and further stating, "the
State Bar is widely misperceived-and .. . [iun addition to mistaking . . identity, many ... fail to
grasp [its] nature and [] purpose").
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right and wrong, precisely because the government branch assignment for
the North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners remains
unclear, with no controlling authority resolving the issue.
In examining the governmental branch assignment of North Carolina's
State Bar and its Board of Law Examiners, this Article takes up a boundary
bureaucracy problem present in a number of jurisdictions:14 namely, that as
entities with branch assignment ambiguity fall off the map, some continue
to function without accountability and adequate oversight." I argue that
this lack of oversight, in the case of the North Carolina Board of Law
Examiners, enables the Board to leverage the ambiguity of its intragovernmental and inter-organizational identity in problematic ways.16
Specifically, inadequate oversight for state boundary bureaucracies has
implications for open government," procedural process," and public
participation,19 leading to threats on the agency's democratic legitimacy.20
For that reason, I believe the work of mapping boundaries, specifically
inter-organizational ones, and charting their implications is itself a part of
the solution to bureaucratic ambiguity, 2 1 as mapping projects like this help
bring what exists at the edges to the foreground.22

14. E.g., Anna M. Tinsley, Texas Lawmakers Worry State Agencies Are Going Rogue, STAR
TELEGRAM
(Dec.
20,
2014),
http://www.startelegram.com/news/politics-government/
article4736820.html.
15. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); see also
GillianE. Metzger, The ConstitutionalDuty to Supervise, 124 YALEL.J. 1836, 1839-40 (2015).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Parts lI, V.
18. See infra Parts 1, V.
19. See infra Parts M, V.
20. See infra Section V.B.
21. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 841-42
(2014) (acknowledging value in mapping boundaries at the federal bureaucracy level for intergovernmental, intra-governmental, and public-private borders).
22. Positive results of bringing issues like this to the foreground appear to be happening
already. On December 16, 2014, a non-partisan division of the North Carolina General Assembly
presented its study of the state's occupational licensing agencies to the Administrative Procedure
Oversight Committee. See N.C, GEN. ASSEMBLY, PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING AGENCIES SHOULD NOT BE CENTRALIZED, BUT STRONGER OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED 5-

7

(2014),

[hereinafter

http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/PED/Reports/docunents/OccLic/OccLicReport.pdf
OCCUPATIONAL

LICENSING AGENCIES

SHOULD NOT BE CENTRALIZED,

BUT

STRONGER OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED]. Reporting its findings, the division concluded that stronger
oversight was needed for North Carolina's occupational licensing agencies. Id. Approximately
three weeks later, on January 11, 2015, for the first time since 1977, the North Carolina Board of
Law Examiners published a public notice of a regularly scheduled meeting. See Notice of June
2015 Board Meeting, posted by Brian Szontagh on Jan. 11, 2015 (on file with author). By the
time this Article was being prepared for print, the Board had published two more notices of
regularly scheduled meetings (October 2015 and January 2016) on its website.
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This Article proceeds as follows: I begin, in Part I, by describing
occupational regulation by state entities where autonomy and selfregulation are predominant features, paying particular attention to
regulation of the legal profession. Part II sets forth the North Carolina State
Bar and the Board of Law Examiners as a case study, narrating agency
development over time within the framework of North Carolina's historical
approach to regulating and licensing lawyers.2 3 Part III follows by mapping
ambiguities of identity and status with respect to the State Bar and the
Board. These comprise ambiguities related to residing at, or just beyond,
three borders: (1) inter-organizational; 2 4 (2) intra-governmental; and
(3) public-private. Immediately after mapping each boundary, I identify the
legal and practical implications of entities residing along such bureaucratic
borders.25 Part IV describes perceived, if not actual, problems involving
either the State Bar or the Board of Law Examiners. Part V offers
suggestions about who is best suited to clarify these ambiguities of identity
and status, and what might be done to manage their implications in the
absence of resolution.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Regulating Occupations and Professions with Agency Models That
FeatureAutonomy
Each state approaches occupational licensing 26 in its own way, and
states vary in how much autonomy they grant members of professions to
self-regulate.27 In fact, the amount of autonomy afforded such agencies is a
23. While not trained as a historian, it is my belief that recounting history involves much
more than linking together facts about the past into a sequential narrative. In producing a
historical narrative of the State Bar's and the Board's genesis and development over a span of
more than eight decades, my intent is to lay the groundwork for the argument of this Article. I
fully acknowledge that the interpretation of history set forth in this Article is my own, and that my
views will likely continue to be refined as I learn of additional events and hear others' versions of
these historical events.
24. In addition to charting the inter-organizational boundary and its implications, I explain
how the presence of that boundary further complicates options for clarifying other ambiguities
concerning agency identity and status.
25. See infra Sections ILI.A.2, IlI.B.2, m.C.2.
26. Since the 1950s, states have increasingly assumed responsibility for regulating
professions practiced within their borders. See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing
the Extent and Influence of Occupation Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB ECON. S 173,
S175 (2013). Between 1952 and 2009, the number of occupations requiring a license leapt from
less than 5% to 29%. Id. at S175-76.
27. See BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE 25-30

app. at 191-95 (1980) (categorizing organizational models based on the level of autonomy the
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primary way to distinguish states' various approaches. 28 At one end of the
spectrum are autonomous agencies and boards, operating with more limited
forms of oversight. 29 At the other end are centralized governmental entities
that regulate and oversee occupational licensing matters for almost all the
professions practiced within state borders. 30 States not occupying either end
of the spectrum have hybrid models of regulating occupational licensing
where power is shared.31
States where the predominant model of professional regulation is
conducted through autonomous boards enjoy a higher degree of selfregulation.32 Autonomous boards generally make their own decisions about
staff, office location, purchasing, procedures, discipline, and admissions,
including licensing qualifications and standards for practice. 33 The North
Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners exemplify occupational
regulation through an autonomous model. 3 4
B. Regulating the Legal Profession and Inherent JudicialPower
"[T]he legal profession has achieved a degree of self-regulation far
beyond either the reality or even the expectations 35 of any other professional
governing body possesses in its operation and development and identifying five models-(1)
Autonomous Boards; (2) Shared Administrative Functions; (3) Shared Authority; (4) Limited
Board Authority; and (5) Centralized Licensing Authority).
28. See id. at 30.
29. See id. at 191-95 (listing the Autonomous Board Model states as Alabama, Arkansas,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia,
and Wyoming).
30. Id. (listing the Centralized Licensing Authority Model states as Illinois and New York).
31. Id. (listing the Shared Administrative Functions Model states as Arizona, Georgia,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oklahoma); id. (listing the Shared Authority
Model states as Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Montana, New
Jersey, Oregon, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont,
and Wisconsin); id. (listing the Limited Board Authority Model states as Connecticut, Florida,
Utah, and Washington).
32. See Alexander Volokh, The New Private-RegulationSkepticism: Non-Delegation, Due
Process, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 931, 937-38 (2014) (describing
the Mississippi Board of Pharmacy as an example of an autonomous state regulatory agency with
broad authority to regulate pharmacy benefit managers).
33. SHIMBERG, supra note 27, at 191-95 (listing North Carolina among the group of states
using occupational licensing models where agencies operate with the most autonomy as compared
to other jurisdictions).
34. See OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AGENCIES SHOULD
STRONGER OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED, supra note 22.

NOT BE CENTRALIZED,

BUT

35. The need for self-regulation of the legal profession is sometimes justified by referencing
the role that lawyers play within our system of government and a claim about lawyers' unique
ability to guard against the abuse of government power. This claim is sound within particular

2016]

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY

639

'

group."36 A primary channel through which lawyers have been able to
obtain such success 37 in their degree of self-regulation is through the
inherent powers doctrine." Inherent judicial power refers to a court's
intrinsic authority to regulate matters that are necessary for it to perform its
judicial functions.
Legal ethics expert Charles Wolfram describes the inherent powers
doctrine as a group of "several different doctrines resembling each other
only superficially."4 0 Unbundling the doctrines, Wolfram lists inherent
judicial powers as (1) the power to develop necessary remedies and
procedures to adjudicate disputes; (2) the power to handle judicial
housekeeping matters; (3) the power to promulgate rules; (4) the power to
maintain court budgets; and (5) the power to regulate lawyers. 4
Wolfram notes that there is long-standing disagreement as to what
compromises the independence and impartiality of the judicial branch of
government, and jurisdictions vary with respect to how courts interpret their
inherent power.42
Regarding inherent power to regulate the legal
profession, Wolfram asserts that courts can tend to one of two approaches.43
In the first approach, courts exercise inherent authority in conservative
ways, acting only when necessary and when other authority does not exist. 44
The exercise of inherent power among these courts is "interstitial and
incremental and . . . very similar to the normal workings of a traditional

contexts. Thus, lawyers who service unpopular clients or advocate in support of non-dominant
beliefs or positions, might be more effective when allowed to operate from a self-regulatory
position that is more independent and distant from government power or other dominant
viewpoints.
36. Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 7, 15
(1989).
37. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1244
(2003) (noting lawyers' "peerless success" when it comes to self-regulation).
38. Opinions vary among jurisdictions as to which branch of government has superior power
regarding the licensing of lawyers. Compare Hanson v. Grattan, 115 P. 646, 646-47 (Kan. 1911)
(concluding in a strict way that courts have exclusive power to set bar admission standards), with
In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 636 (N.C. 1906) (confirming that in North Carolina
setting bar admission standards is an exercise of the state's police power and properly vested in
the General Assembly). See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2.1, at
20-21 (practitioner's ed. 1986) [hereinafter WOLFRAM I].
39. WOLFRAM I, supra note 38, at 22.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 22-23.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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common-law court." 4 5 These courts embrace what Wolfram calls the
"affirmative aspects" of the inherent powers doctrine.46
In the second approach, which Wolfram calls "negative" inherent
powers, courts claim the "exclusive"47 authority to regulate lawyers.48 I
jurisdictions like these, legislative encroachment into lawyer regulation can
be treated as a violation of separation of powers. Wolfram critiques courts'
expansion of the inherent powers doctrine in this way, warning of "obvious
risks ofjudicial abuse and maladministration." 4 9
Additionally, a judicial claim to have the exclusive power to regulate
lawyers, including entrance into the profession, can have implications for
the duties and obligations of bar admission authorities.5 o For example,
administrative agencies that derive their power from the legislative branch
are routinely prohibited from acting in contravention to duly enacted
statutes.s1 In contrast, agencies created by the judicial branch are not
always constrained in this way.52
As shown below, it is not clear from where the North Carolina State
North
Bar and the Board of Law Examiners derive their powers.
Carolina's courts have never claimed exclusive power to regulate lawyers.54
In addition, North Carolina's legislature has a long history of setting the
standards for bar admission and directing or creating entities to implement
those standards." This division of authority raises the question: To which

45. Id. at 23.
46. Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of The InherentPowers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J., 1989-90, at 1, 4 [hereinafter WOLFRAM II]
(finding this approach "sound and compatible with fundamental themes in the law").
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id. at 6-7, 14.
49. WOLFRAM I, supra note 38, at 23-24.
50. E.g., Wilson v. Bd. of Governors, Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 585 P.2d 136, 142 (Wash.
1978) (finding Washington's state Administrative Procedure Act inapplicable to the Board of
Governors of the Washington State Bar Association, as the association "acts as an arm of the
court" in administering the bar application process and, as much, "is clearly within the judicial
branch").
51. See, e.g., Connecticut v. White, 528 A.2d 811, 815-18 (Conn. 1987).
52. See, e.g., Stewart v. Miss. Bar, 84 So.3d 9, 15 (Miss. 2011) ("While these laws seemingly
prevent the Bar from inquiring about an expunction, they are not necessarily the final say. We
have held that statutes are trumped by contradictory rules governing matters over which this Court
has exclusive authority."); Caranchini v. Mo. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 447 S.W.3d 768, 775 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2014) (stating, "the Missouri Board falls under the umbrella of judicial and not executive
power").
53. See infra Part I.
54. See infra Section H.A
55. See infra Section II.A.
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branch of government do the State Bar and the Board belong and to which
laws and procedures are they subject? 6
II.

CASE STUD' TBE
LAW EXAMINERS

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR AND TIE BOARD OF

The following case study uses two state agencies-the North Carolina
State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners-as examples of agencies that
operate under ambiguities of identity and status based upon unresolved
government branch assignments and blurred hierarchical relationships with
the private sector and other agencies." The origins and development of
these ambiguities are traced in four subsequent sections. Section A-The
Early Years-highlights North Carolina's version of the then-popular
nation-wide debate regarding how best to raise standards for admission to
the bar. Section B-Creation of the State Bar and the Board-encapsulates
North Carolina's response for how best to maintain high standards for bar
admission. Section C-North Carolina Enacts Its First Administrative
Procedure Act-recounts a series of convoluted events from the 1970s that
gave rise to the State Bar and the Board's claims of being part of the
judicial branch of government, not the executive, thus, cementing an intragovernmental ambiguity that, to this day, has never been authoritatively
decided. Section D-Operating and Developing Under a Claim to be
Judicial-highlights key events since the mid-1970s that have involved
ambiguities of identity and legal status of the State Bar and the Board.
A.

The Early Years

In 1899, more than thirty years before creating the North Carolina State
Bar and the Board of Law Examiners, the North Carolina General
Assembly ("General Assembly") enacted legislation incorporating" the

56. See supra Introduction.
57. See infra Parts H, TH.
58. An Act to Incorporate the North Carolina Bar Association, ch. 335, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws
923, 923-25. Worth clarifying now is the difference between the North Carolina Bar Association
(Association) and the North Carolina State Bar (State Bar). Briefly, the State Bar is an agency of
the state, created by the North Carolina General Assembly (General Assembly) in 1933 for the
purpose of regulating the legal profession, "including the admission of lawyers to practice and
their discipline and disbarment." An Act to Provide for the Organization as an Agency of the
State of North Carolina of the North Carolina State Bar, and for Its Regulation, Powers, and
Government, Including the Admission of Lawyers to Practice and Their Discipline and
Disbarment, ch. 210, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 313 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24
(2015)). Though membership in the State Bar is required, Association membership is not. The
Association is a voluntary alliance of lawyers who join together to promote the profession, serve
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North Carolina Bar Association ("Association").5 9 Among topics first taken
up by the Association were standards for admission to the bar.60 During the
Association's second meeting, a committee suggested that applicants'
preparation period for studying law be increased from one year to two. 6 1
From the start-despite North Carolina requiring only one year of studythe proposed increase triggered controversy and heavy debate. 62 Those
opposing an increase in the amount of time for pre-examination study
preferred instead a "more stringent bar examination."63 In 1900, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina administered the bar examination upon
the General Assembly's directive6 as it had been doing since 1818.65 The
lawyer licensing statute that was in effect during 1900 reads:
Sec. 17. Attorneys licensed by justices of supreme court. Persons who may
apply for admission to practice as attorneys . . . shall undergo an

examination before two or more of the justices of the supreme court; and,
on receiving certificates . . of their competent law knowledge and upright
character, shall be admitted as attorneys in the courts specified in such
certificates."
By 1903, the North Carolina Bar Association was discussing a proposal
to present to the General Assembly that would allow the Association an
official role in administering examinations for admission to the bar.6 ' Two
years later, the Revisal of 1905 brought statutory change, including changes

the public, and advance the administration of justice. The Association, except for a brief period of
time, see, e.g., Comm. on Grievances of State Bar Ass'n v. Strickland, 158 S.E. 110, 111 (N.C.
1931), has not undertaken the formal regulation of North Carolina's lawyers.
59. 1899 N.C. Private Laws at 923-25.
60. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR
ASSOCIATION, 2 REPORTS N.C. BAR Ass'N 49 (J. Crawford Biggs ed., 1900).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. J. EDWIN HENDRICKS, SEEKING LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION 1899-1999, at 44 (1999); see also REPORT OF THE SECOND
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 60.
64. See 1 WILLIAM T. DORTCH ET AL., THE CODE OF NORTH CAROLINA

§

17 (New York,

Banks & Bros. Law Publishers 1883).
65. See 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (Henry Potter et al., eds., 1821). Prior
to this date and for a brief interval from 1869 to 1871, admission to the bar was handled on a more
local level, requiring applicants to appear before two superior court judges. See DEPARTMENT OF
CULTURAL RESOURCES DIVISION OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
SECTION, GUIDE TO RESEARCH MATERIALS IN THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE ARCHIVES: STATE
AGENCY RECORDS 781-82 (1995).
66. DORTCH ET AL., supra note 64 (emphasis added).
67. See REPORT OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR
ASSOCIATION, 5 REPORTS N.C. BAR ASS'N 31 (J. Crawford Biggs ed., 1903).
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to lawyer licensing statutes.68 While the high court would still administer
examinations for admission to the bar, the General Assembly's directives
were noticeably different:
207. Examination. No person shall practice law without first obtaining [a]
license . . . from the Supreme Court. Applicants for license shall be
examined only on the first Monday of each term of the Supreme Court.
All examination shall be in writing, and based upon such course of study,
and conducted under such rules, as the court may prescribe. All applicants
who shall satisfy the court of their competent knowledge of the law shall
receive license to practice in all the courts of the state. 69
208. Conditionsprecedent to examination. Before being allowed to stand
an examination each applicant must . . . file with the clerk of the court a
certificate of good moral character signed by two attorneys who practice
in that court.70

Within one year, these statutory changes would spark litigation about
which entity in North Carolina-the General Assembly or the Supreme
Court of North Carolina-held the power to set bar admission standards,
since the new statute did not involve the supreme court in assessing a bar
applicant's character.7 1
In early 1906, several upstanding licensed members of the bar filed a
petition in the supreme court.72 In the petition, the members challenged the
admission of several new applicants on the grounds that the applicants
lacked the requisite moral character, despite having filed certificates of
good moral character as directed by the 1905 statute. 73 The members
argued that the newly enacted statute 74 was unconstitutional because it
violated the separation of powers doctrine.7 5 Specifically, the. members
contended the independence of the judiciary would be compromised if the
court were not allowed to set its own requirements for admission to the
bar,7 6 as the new statute did not direct the court to inquire into an
applicant's character and fitness.77

68. Compare 1 THOMAS WOMACK
with DORTCH ET AL., supra note 64.
69. WOMACK ET AL., supra note 68.
70. Id. § 208 (emphasis added).

ET AL., REVISAL OF

1905

OF NORTH CAROLINA

§

207,

71. See In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635 (N.C. 1906).
72. Id. at 635.
73. Id.
74. Compare DORTCH ET AL., supra note 64, with WOMACK ET AL., supra note 68.
75. See In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. at 636-37. See generally WOMACK ET AL.,
supra note 68, at §§ 207-08.
76. In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. at 635-37.
77. Id.
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A divided court responded.78 Three of the five justices found the
separation of powers argument unpersuasive, with one inquiring:
How can the right to pass on an applicant's previous conduct or his
character be considered as a power essential to a court's existence, when
he has never become an attorney or been given an opportunity to have his
demeanor observed or considered?"
In a concurring opinion, the Chief Justice acknowledged that bar
admission matters are often entrusted to courts,o but that North Carolina
took a different approach, and considered the matter "wholly subject to
legislative action . .. [not] a necessary or inherent part of the . . . judicial
power.""
A majority of the justices agreed that the power to set standards and
procedures for admission to the bar was an exercise of the state's police
power and was properly vested in the legislative branch.82 They further
agreed that the General Assembly's exercise of such power did not
compromise the court's status as a separate and independent branch of
government charged primarily with interpreting the law and impartially
adjudicating disputes." In re Applicants for License demonstrates that
North Carolina's courts do not claim the exclusive power to regulate the
practice of law. Summarizing the point, the Chief Justice wrote:
[T]his court cannot add to the requirements of the lawmaking body as to
lawyers any more than it can to the requirement for entering upon the
practice of medicine or dentistry. It is true lawyers are officers of the
courts, but so are sheriffs, clerks, and the like, over whose selection the
court has no control.'
Two justices dissented, stating that because admission to the bar was a
judicial act, the court retained its authority to ensure that "immoral" persons
were not admitted.85 While most of the justices agreed, "admission to the

78. Id.
79. Id. at 637.
80. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. II, § 30 ("The Supreme Court shall have administrative control
of all the courts of the state, and disciplinary authority concerning all judicial officers and
attorneys at law in the state.").
81. In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. at 635, 640 (Clark, C.J., concurring) (citing In re
Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (N.Y. 1860)).
82. Id. at 636-39 (majority opinion), 640 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
83. Id. at 636-37 (majority opinion), 640 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
84. Id. at 640 (Clark, C.J., concurring) (noting further that "since 1754 an oath has also been
required by statute, the administering of which is the 'act of admission to the bar,' . . . [and] [o]f
course, as the oath is required by statute, that, like any other requirement can be repealed" by the
General Assembly).
85. Id. at 642 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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bar was a judicial act," they did not agree on the meaning of that phrase"judicial act"-or the implications of that function.8 6
As demonstrated with the In re Applicants for License case, North
Carolina, is one of a handful of jurisdictions" wherein its high court has
acknowledged that the power to set standards for admission to the bar
resides with the legislature," rather than a judicially created administrative
entity."
In 1932, however, the North Carolina Bar Association proposed
legislation that would make the legal profession self-governing9 0 and create
the North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners as state
government entities. 91
B. Creating the State Bar and the Board
The North Carolina Bar Association's 1932 proposed legislation was
modified by the General Assembly and culminated in the passage of a
decisive Act in 1933.92 The Act served the important function of creating

86. "We exercise our judicial functions in determining whether the applicant possesses the
required qualifications, and here, our power in the premises end." Id. at 636-37 (majority
opinion). "I am of the opinion ... that when the power to grant licenses is possessed by this court,
from whatever source derived, the exercise of it by the court is a judicial act, and cannot be

.

controlled in any material feature by the Legislature." Id. at 641 (Brown, J., dissenting). "[T]he
power to decide finally who possesses sufficient character for admission is a judicial function
from the nature of the question. Id. at 645 (Walker, J., dissenting). Contra id. at 641 (Clark, C.J.,
concurring) ("We do not examine applicants for license by virtue of our judicial functions ... but
. . only out of courtesy and respect to the Legislature.").
87. Compare State ex rel. Robeson v. Or. State Bar, 632 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Or. 1981) (taking
a restrained approach), with Harlen v. City of Helena, 676 P.2d 191, 193 (Mont. 1984) (taking a
more radical approach).
88. See In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. at 635-39.
89. See id. at 641 (Clark, C.J., concurring); In re Ebbs, 63 S.E. 190, 196 (N.C. 1908) ("The
courts of this state will exhaust their power to purge the bar of unworthy members, but dare not
assume power to do so.").
90. See REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR

ASSOCIATION, 34 REPORTS N.C. BAR ASS'N 1, 199, 213 (H.M. London, ed., 1932).

The 1932

proposal, as originally presented, had the deans of the various law schools within the state serving
as members of the Board of Law Examiners. Id. This aspect of Board composition was
noticeably controversial. Id. In what was perhaps somewhat of an over-correction, the final
version of the Bar Association's 1932 proposal, much of which would be enacted into law by the
General Assembly, contained a provision stating, "but no teacher at any law school shall serve on
the Board." Id.
91. PROCEEDINGS FIRST ANNUAL MEETING NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, 1-4 N.C. STATE

BAR 1, 5 (H.M. London, ed., 1934).
92. An Act to Provide for the Organization as an Agency of the State of North Carolina of
the North Carolina State Bar, and for Its Regulation, Powers, and Government, Including the
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and organizing the North Carolina State Bar as an "agency of the state." 93
The state agency provided for the long-desired self-regulation of the legal
profession. 94 The full title of the twenty-one-section Act indicates that the
Act covered both admission to the bar and the disciplining of lawyers:
An Act To Providefor the OrganizationAs an Agency of the State ofNorth
Carolina of the North CarolinaState Bar, andfor Its Regulation, Powers,
and Government, Including the Admission of Lawyers to Practice and
Their Discipline and Disbarment.95
The structure of the North Carolina State Bar, as set forth by the Act,
entailed a governing Council9 6 composed of elected attorney representatives
from each of the state's twenty judicial districts.97 According to the explicit
wording of the Act, these members were not to be considered "public
officers." 98 Council members served three-year terms and were elected by
other licensed attorneys practicing or residing in the candidate's judicial
district.99
The original Act directed the Council to elect, upon its
organization, three officers-a president, a vice-president, and a
secretary.10
Within the organizing Act of the North Carolina State Bar, the General
Assembly also created the Board of Law Examiners for the related but
distinct purpose "of examining applicants and providing rules and
regulations for admission to the state bar.""0 '
The Board would be

Admission of Lawyers to Practice and Their Discipline and Disbarment, ch. 210, 1933 N.C. Sess.
Laws 313 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §84-15 to -38 (2015)).

93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Compare id., with REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 90, at 199.
96. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 313-14; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-15, -17 (2015)
(identifying the State Bar as an agency with powers vested in a Council).
97. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 315. A "judicial district" comprises a "district bar." Id.
District bar boundaries co-exist with boundaries for prosecutorial districts. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §
84-19 (2015). In 1934, there were twenty judicial districts, providing for a Council of about the
same number. See PROCEEDINGS FIRST ANNUAL MEETING NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, supra
note 91, at 6. Presently there are forty-five. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-60(a)(1) (2015); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. §84-19.
98. "Neither a Councillor [sic] nor any officer of the Council or of [t]he North Carolina State
Bar shall be deemed as such to be a public officer as that phrase is used in the Constitution and
laws of the State of North Carolina." See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 315.
99. See id. at 314-15.

100. See id. at 318-19.
101. This section contained a savings clause keeping the presently existing statutory standards
for admission to the bar "in force until superseded, changed, or modified." Id. at 319.
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comprised of six licensed attorneys, 10 2 elected by, but not necessarily
10 Finally, the Act provided, "the secretary of the
members of, the Council.o
North Carolina State Bar shall be the secretary of the Board, and serve
without additional pay."" The single-secretary structure would be in place
during the State Bar and the Board's first forty years of existence. 05
The General Assembly delineated the specific powers of the State
Bar's governing Council, provided certain procedural safeguards, and
delegated veto power to the state supreme court with respect to the State
Bar's rulemaking power.106 The Act described the Council's powers as
follows: "the Council shall be competent to exercise the entire powers of
the North Carolina State Bar in respect to the interpretation and
administration of this Act." 0 7

.

102. Ratified in April 1933, the original Act indicated that "[t]he Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall be Chairman of the Board." Id. One month later, and before the Act had taken effect,
the General Assembly ratified a supplemental act. See Act to Amend H.B. 221, Sess. 1933,
Entitled "An Act to Provide for the Organization as an Agency of the State of North Carolina of
the North Carolina State Bar, and for Its Regulation, Powers, and Government, Including the
Admission of Lawyers to Practice and Their Discipline and Disbarment," so as to Provide for the
Issuance of License to Practice and for the Constitution of the Board of Law Examiners, ch. 331,
1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 492. The supplemental act struck the language directing the Chief Justice
to serve as chairman. See id. at 493. The substituted language provides: the Board shall consist of
six members of the bar and "such member of the Supreme Court of North Carolina as that court .
. may select and commission for such special purpose. . . . The member . . . selected and
shall be and act as chairman ex-officio." See id. Within the language of the
commissioned ...
supplemental act, the General Assembly indicated that the supplemental act "shall be ... deemed
and construed as a part of [the original act] as fully and to the same extent as if the provisions had
been included in [the original act] when ratified." See id. By 1935, the General Assembly
enacted yet another law. This one struck all language about any supreme court justice serving on
the Board. See An Act to Authorize the Board of Law Examiners to Elect Its Own Chairman, ch.
61, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 56. This amendment changed the number of elected members from
the practicing bar from six to seven and authorized the Board to elect its own chairman. See id. §
3.
103. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319. But see Certificate of Organization of the North
Carolina State Bar, published in 205 N.C. 853 app. at 853-54 (1933) [hereinafter Certificate of
Organization of the North Carolina State Bar] (stating that "[n]o member of the Council shall be a
member of the Board of Law Examiners, and no member of the Board of Law Examiners shall be
a member of the Council").
104. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319.
105. Compare id., with An Act to Amend G.S. 84-24 Pertaining to the Board of Law
Examiners, ch. 13, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 6 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24
(2015)) (stating "the Board may employ an Executive Secretary").
106. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-15 to -24 (2015).
107. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 314 (emphasis added); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17:
The Council shall be composed of a variable number of councilors equal to the number of judicial
districts plus 16, the officers of the North Carolina State Bar, who shall be councilors during their
respective terms of office, and each retiring president of the North Carolina State Bar who shall be
a councilor for one year from the date of expiration of his term as president.
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Despite the powers provided to the State Bar, the Council's power was
subordinate to that of the General Assembly. 0 ' The Act reads: "Subject to
the superior authority of the General Assembly to legislate thereon by
general laws, and except as herein otherwise limited, the Council is hereby
vested, as an agency of the State, with control of the discipline and
disbarment of attorneys practicing law in the State."'" Moreover, any rules
promulgated by the North Carolina State Bar Council"o would be subject to
the approval of the supreme court and must be certified as being consistent
with the Act creating and describing the powers of the State Bar and the
Board."'
Under the structure provided by the original organizing Act, the North
Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners was born." 2 With the
General Assembly having delegated power"' and independent rulemaking
authority to each,' 14 the State Bar and the Board jointly claimed the
privilege of self-regulation for North Carolina's legal profession. In June
1934, during the State Bar's first annual meeting, President I.M. Bailey
noted its significance, stating, despite eight years of:
Continuous[]... doubt as to what would be the outcome of the effort to
bring to the profession the right of self-government .. . the grant of power
was extended; . . . for the first time, we are met to determine for ourselves,
individually and collectively, what disposition we shall make of . .. [the
General Assembly's] . . . grant of power."s

108. 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319.
109. 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319. But see An Act to Amend the Authority ofNorth Carolina
State Bar Concerning Paralegals and Fees Relating to Certification and to Extend the Sunset of the
Industrial Commission Fee Earmarked for Information Technology, ch. 174, 2004 N.C. Sess.
Laws 670, 671 (striking the language "[s]ubject to the superior authority of the General Assembly
to legislate thereon by general laws, and except as herein otherwise limited" from N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 84-23). With this introductory clause now eliminated, the statute concerning the powers
of the State Bar Council now reads: "The Council is vested, as an agency of the State, with the
authority to regulate the professional conduct of licensed lawyers and State Bar certified
paralegals. . . . The Council may do all things necessary in the furtherance of the purposes of this
Article that are not otherwise prohibited by law." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23 (2015).
110. The Council is the governing body of the North Carolina State Bar and is comprised of
three public members who are appointed by the Governor and approximately sixty attorney
members who are elected by their attorney peers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-18.
111. The statutes that create and describe the powers of the State Bar and the Board are found
in Article 4 of Chapter 84 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Chapter 84 is the section of the
state's General Statutes that governs attorneys. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-21.
112. 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 313.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115.

at 5-6.

PROCEEDINGS FIRST ANNUAL MEETING NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, supra note 91,

2016]

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY

649

The shift to self-regulation brought the bar new independence but not
complete autonomy,11 6 as it recognized that it must cooperate with both the
judiciary and the public."'
In 1937, three years after the State Bar and the Board were created, the
General Assembly added a new provision to the State Bar and Board's
enabling statutes. 1 s This provision clarified that the General Assembly's
creation of the State Bar and the Board in no way affected the inherent
powers of North Carolina's courts." 9 This Act 20 clarifies that the power
delegated to the Bar and the Board could not supersede the inherent powers
doctrine.' 2 ' While the statute acknowledges the inherent powers of the
Court,'22 important questions remained unanswered, as the 1937 provision
did not set forth a protocol about how the court's power would be exercised
alongside the Bar and the Board's power.12 3
Over the next several decades, the State Bar and the Board would go on
to operate, during which their identities and status would be gradually
refined.

C. EnactingNorth Carolina'sAdministrative ProcedureAct (APA)
Approximately forty years after the General Assembly created the
North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners, North Carolina
enacted its first Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' 24 The purpose of
North Carolina's APA, both at the time of its original enactment and today,
is to establish a uniform system of procedures' 2 5 for agencies 126 to follow in

"

,

116. Id. at 4-6.
117. Id. at 7. This recognition was reflected in the opening remarks made by President Bailey
at the State Bar's first annual meeting: "While we must maintain a position of leadership, we
cannot undertake our work alone. On the one hand stands a Judiciary which has no superior ....
and on the other hand, a public intelligent and quick ....
118. An Act to Amend Chapter 210 of the Public Laws of 1933 Relating to the Authority of
the North Carolina State Bar, ch. 51, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 98, 99 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
84-36 (2015)) (reserving the court's inherent power "to deal with its attorneys").
119. Id. ("Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed as disabling or abridging the
inherent powers of the court to deal with its attorneys.").
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See id.

124. An Act to Establish Procedures for the Conduct of Proceedings Before Administrative
Agencies and to Establish a Code of Administrative Regulations, ch. 1331, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws
691, 691.
125. Id. at 692 ("The purpose and intent of this Chapter shall be to establish as nearly as
possible a uniform system of administrative procedure for State agencies."). Accord N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150B-1(a) (2015) ("This Chapter establishes a uniform system of administrative rule
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both the rulemaking and adjudicatory context.' 27 Immediately set forth
below are several features to North Carolina's APA that are both
longstanding and relevant to the arguments set forth in this Article.
Under North Carolina's APA, agency rulemaking is limited to adopting
only those rules' 28 "that are expressly authorized by federal or State law and
necessary to serve the public interest."l2 9 Rules must be "reasonably
necessary" to implement or interpret such law,' 30 and they must be written
"in a clear and unambiguous manner."l 3' Agencies are required to establish
and publish their procedures in advance so that others may be instructed on
how to participate in the rulemaking process.132 Other features that foster
public engagement include requirements for agencies to adopt rules that
allow stakeholders to petition for rule changes,133 and seek declaratory
relief. 134
In the mid-1970s, the passage of North Carolina's APA was a
significant event for state government regulatory entities; evidence confirms

making and adjudicatory procedures for agencies. The procedures ensure that the functions of
rulemaking, investigation, advocacy, and adjudication are not all performed by the same person in
the administrative process.").
126. "'Agency' means an agency or an officer in the executive branch of the government of
this State and includes the Council of State, the Governor's Office, a board, a commission, a
department, a division, a council, and any other unit of government in the executive branch."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(la). Although "agency" is currently defined as a unit of government
that is expressly within the executive branch, North Carolina's APA did not originally define
agency in this way. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(l) (Supp. 1974) (excluding from the
definition of "agency" those agencies within either the legislative or judicial branches of
government and not referencing the executive branch of government when defining the term).
127. See, e.g., Overton v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 S.E.2d 495, 498 (N.C. 1981)
(applying APA standards for judicial review "in the interest of uniformity in reviewing
administrative board decisions").
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(8a) (2015) ("'Rule' means any agency regulation, standard, or
statement of general applicability that implements or interprets an enactment of the General
Assembly . . . or that describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency. The term
includes the establishment of a fee and the amendment or repeal of a prior rule.").
129. Id. § 150B-19.1(a)(1).
130. Id. § 150B-19.1(a)(3).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 150B-19.1(c) (requiring an agency to post the text of a proposed rule on its website
as well as instructions on how and where to submit oral or written comments on the proposed
rule); see also id. § 150B-21.2 (setting forth requirements for agencies with respect to receiving
public comments, holding public hearings, maintaining public mailing lists, and keeping public
records of rule making proceedings).
133. Id. § 150B-20(a) ("A person may petition an agency to adopt a rule by submitting to the
agency a written rule-making petition requesting the adoption.").
134. Id. § 150B-4(a) ("On request of a person aggrieved, an agency shall issue a declaratory
ruling as to the validity of a rule or as to the applicability to a given state of facts of a ... rule or
order of the agency.").
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that several entities were unaware of the Act's implications or how to
comply with its requirements. 15 The General Assembly, responding to
widespread struggle among agencies to comply with the new APA,
extended the deadline for agencies to file APA-compliant rules.136 While
agencies labored to draft new rules,137 their assigned government branch
became suddenly and considerably significant, as the APA exempted from
its reach those agencies that were within either the legislative or judicial
branches of state government.138 The following sections within this case
study part of the Article describe a series of events relating to the passage of
the APA and the government branch assignments for the North Carolina
State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners.
1.

The Board Files APA-Compliant Rules

Meeting the filing deadline,"' the North Carolina Board of Law
Examiners filed new APA-compliantl40 rules with the Office of the

&

135. See, e.g., Letter from Jimmie E. Clemmons, Sec'y, Bd. of Comm'r Navigation
Pilotage, to Millard R. Rich, Jr., Ass't Att'y Gen., State of N.C. Dep't of Justice (Oct. 23, 1975)
[hereinafter Letter dated Oct. 23, 1975, from Jimmie E. Clemmons to Millard R. Rich, Jr.] (on file
with author):
This Board has been unofficially informed that there now exist [sic] a new law titled, "North
Carolina Administrative Procedures Act." . . . Admittedly we know very little about this new
act and specifically request clarification on the following: (1) Can the Attorney General's
Office advise this Board as to the particulars of this act, and better yet forward a copy? (2)
Should legal services be required by this Board to assist in formulating such rules and
regulations for approval, can this Board employ the services of an attorney?
136. See An Act to Delay the Effective Date of, "An Act to Establish Procedures for the
Conduct of Proceedings Before the Administrative Agencies and to Establish a Code of
Administrative Regulations," ch. 69, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 44.
137. See Memorandum from Norma S. Harrell, Assoc. Att'y Gen., Admin. Procedures
Section, State of N.C. Dep't of Justice, to All State Agencies Covered by the Admin. Procedures
Act 30-31 (May 5, 1975) [hereinafter Memorandum dated May 5, 1975, from Norma S. Harrell to
All State Agencies Covered by the APA] ("We realize that many of you are having difficulty
sorting out the numerous provisions of the new North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, G.
S. 150A, and the ways in which it will affect your agency. To help you in the task of bringing
your agency into compliance with the Act, we are distributing the following guidelines .... ) (on
file with author).
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(1) (Supp. 1974) (excluding from the definition of
"agency" those agencies within either the legislative or judicial branches of government). Cf
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(la) (2015) (stating that agency "means an agency or an officer in the
executive branch of government").
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-59 (Supp. 1975) (reflecting the extended deadline for filing new
rules). C.f N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-59 (Supp. 1974) (reflecting the original deadline as July 1,
1975); see also Memorandum from Norma S. Harrell, Assoc. Att'y Gen., Admin. Procedures
Section, State of N.C. Dep't of Justice, to All A.P.A. Coordinators and Licensing Boards (Jan. 16,
1976) [hereinafter Memorandum dated Jan. 16, 1976, from Norma S. Harrell to All A.P.A.
Coordinators and Licensing Boards] ("This memo is merely to remind you that the deadline for
filing rules with the Attorney General's office pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act is
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Attorney General, on January 30 1976.141 The Board's new rules 1 42
displayed a numbering system that anticipated their inclusion in North
Carolina's Administrative Code.1 43 Throughout its rules, the Board cited to
APA provisions requiring specific rules, 1" as well as other statutory

almost here.... Your rules must be filed by 5:30 p.m. Friday, January 30, since January 31 is a
Saturday.") (on file with author).
140. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (Supp. 1974), with Regulation Certification
from Fred P. Parker III, Exec. Sec'y, N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, to Rufus L. Edmisten, Att'y Gen.
(filed Jan. 30, 1976, by Bd. of Law Examr's with Admin. Procedures Section, Office of Att'y
Gen., pursuant to Feb. 1, 1976, filing deadline set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-59)
[hereinafter Regulation Certification from N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs filed with N.C. Office of
Att'y Gen. Admin. Procedures Section on Jan. 30, 1976] (on file with author).
141. See Regulation Certification from N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs filed with N.C. Office of
Att'y Gen. Admin. Procedures Section on Jan. 30, 1976, supra note 140.
142. This note explains how this Article cites to current and previous versions of the Rules
Governing Admission to the Practice of Law promulgated by the North Carolina Board of Law
Examiners. The Board's current Rules are available on its website. See RULES GOVERNING
ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, N.C. BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS,

http://ncble.org/wp-

content/uploads/2015/09/rules.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). When citing current rules, this
Article uses the following citation form: RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF
LAW, supra note 142. When citing to previous versions of the Board's rules, this Article cites to
the appendix of the North Carolina Reports volume in which the Board's rules are published. The
following example is illustrative: RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW,

published in 289 N.C. 735 app. at 738-61 (1976). Readers should be aware that within the North
CarolinaReports, the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law are labeled in a variety
of ways, including Rules and Regulations of the Board of Law Examiners and Rules of Board of
Law Examiners: State ofNorth Carolina. Related to the problem identified in Part IV.B of this
Article regarding the Board's somewhat private mode of operation, I assert that the Board's rules
should be numbered by title, chapter, and section and published in the North Carolina
Administrative Code pursuant to statutory directive. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-21 (2015)
("Copies of all the rules and regulations ... adopted by the Council shall be certified to the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, entered by the North Carolina Supreme Court
upon its minutes, and published in the next ensuing number of the North Carolina Reports and in
the North Carolina Administrative Code: .... ); id. § 84-24 ("The Board of Law Examiners,
subject to the approval of the Council, shall by majority vote, from time to time, make, alter, and
amend such rules and regulations for admission to the Bar as in their judgment shall promote the
welfare of the State and the profession: .... ).
143. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, published in 289 N.C.

735 app. at 735-37 (1976) (including the heading: "North Carolina Administrative Code; Title 21
Occupational Licensing Boards; Chapter 30 Board of Law Examiners" and a numbering system
evincing administrative code conventions set forth in a table of contents with fourteen separate
sections of Board rules numbered for placement within Chapter 30 of Title 21 of North Carolina's
Administrative Code). Title 21 of the North Carolina Administrative Code was, and still is, the
title reserved for state occupational licensing board rules. See, e.g., 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 58
(2016) (N.C. Real Estate Commission).
144. See generally RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, published in

289 N.C. 735 app. at 738-61 (1976).
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provisions authorizing Board rules, a practice that complied with APA
directives.1 45
Significantly, the Board's new rules contained an entire section
devoted to rulemaking procedures. 146 These procedures had democratic
benefits, including notice-and-comment rulemaking and declaratory relief
mechanisms.1 47
Under the new notice-and-comment-type procedures, the Board was
required to maintain a mailing list to which anyone, upon request, could be
added.1 48 Those on the list would receive advance notice of any hearing
related to rulemaking.1 49 List members and others could then either submit
comments in writing or attend the hearing.' Forms of public participation
that were contemplated by the procedures included the presentation of oral
data, views, or arguments on proposed bar admission rules.15 ' Under these
procedural process rules, written advance notice of such a rulemaking
proceeding would be given to all of the State's law schools.'5 2 Further,
anyone who wished to request the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule
was provided an avenue to petition. 15

145. Such citation is required for agencies engaged in rulemaking.

See N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 150A-60(1) (Supp. 1974); Memorandum dated May 5, 1975, from Norma S. Harrell to All State
Agencies Covered by the APA, supra note 137; accord N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.2(c)(3)
(2015) ("A notice of the proposed text of a rule must include.. .[a] citation to the law that gives the
agency the authority to adopt the rule.").
146.

RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, in 289 N.C. 735 app. at 736

(1976) (titling Section .1100 Rulemaking Procedures; and including subsections for Petitions
(Section .1101); Notice (Section .1102); Hearings (Section .1103); and Declaratory Rulings
(Section .1104)).
147. Id. By the end of July 1977, North Carolina's Attorney General had acknowledged the
Board's decision to withdraw the rules it had filed eighteen months prior. Letter from Rufus L.
Edmisten, Att'y Gen., State of N.C. Dep't of Justice, to Fred P. Parker III, Exec. Sec'y, N.C. Bd.
of Law Exam'rs (July 27, 1977) [hereinafter Letter dated July 27, 1977, from Rufus L. Edmisten
to Fred P. Parker III]. In addition to no longer being filed alongside other occupational licensing
entities' rules, the Board had amended its rules, repealing the entire chapter dedicated to
rulemaking procedures.

See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW,

published in 293 N.C. 760 app. at 762 (1977).
148. 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1102 (1976) (withdrawn 1977). No such provision is included
in the Board of Law Examiners' current Rules Governing Admission to the Practiceof Law. See
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, N.C. BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS,

http://ncble.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/rules.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
149. See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1102 (1976) (withdrawn 1977).
150. See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1103 (1976) (withdrawn 1977).
151. See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1103(b) (1976) (withdrawn 1977).
152. See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1102(c) (1976) (withdrawn 1977).
153. 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1101 (1976) (withdrawn 1977). No such avenue to petition is
included in the Board of Law Examiners' current Rules. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO
THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 142.
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In addition to notice-and-comment-type rulemaking procedures, the
Board's procedural process rules set forth an express avenue for declaratory
relief.' 54 A person who was substantially affected by a rule could request a
declaratory ruling regarding whether or how the rule applied to a given
factual situation.'
Finally, as is typical within notice-and-comment-type
rulemaking frameworks, a record was to be kept.' 56 Such record would
allow others a view into the Board's decision-making process over a period
of time. 157
By February 1, 1976, these rules, which included procedural
safeguards, were approved by the North Carolina State Bar Council' and
certified by the chief justice of the supreme court as being "not
inconsistent" with the Bar and the Board's enabling statutes. 1 Although
the Board of Law Examiners filed APA-compliant rules by the January 30,
1976, deadline, nothing suggests that the State Bar did so.1 60
2.

The State Bar Receives a Report and Letters from the Office of the
Attorney General

Approximately two months after the APA rule-filing deadline, on April
15, 1976, Mr. David Crump, an Associate Attorney General from the
Administrative Procedures Act Division, drafted an eight-page letter
addressed to Mr. B.E. James, the Executive Secretary of the North Carolina
State Bar. The letter begins:
Dear Mr. James:
This is in response to your inquiry as to whether, and to what extent the
North Carolina State Bar is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,
Chapter 150A of the General Statutes. . . . It has [] been suggested,
because of the involvement of the Supreme Court in making rules for the
Bar, and because of the inherent powers of the court to discipline members

154. 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1104 (1976) (withdrawn 1977).
155. See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1104(a) (1976) (withdrawn 1977).
156. See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1403 (1976) (withdrawn 1977).
157. See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1403 (1976) (withdrawn 1977).
158. N.C. State Bar, Unpublished Minutes of N.C. State Bar Council Meeting, (Jan. 16, 1976)
[hereinafter Unpublished Minutes of N.C. State Bar Council Meeting] (on file with author; also
available at N.C. State Bar headquarters); see Memorandum dated May 5, 1975, from Norma S.
Harrell to All State Agencies Covered by the APA, supra note 137; see also Memorandum from
Norma S Harrell, Assoc. Att'y for the Att'y Gen. Admin. Procedures Section, State of N.C. Dep't
of Justice, to All State Agencies Subject to the Admin. Procedures Act 3, § 5 (Oct. 7, 1975) (on
file with author).
159. RULEs GOVERNING ADMISsION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, published in 289 N.C. 735
app. at 761-62.
160. Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to BE. James, supra note 9, at 1.
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of the bar, that the Bar is exempt from Chapter 150A under the judicial
exception to the definition of agency [as set forth in the APA]. After
careful research and consideration, we find this argument unpersuasive.161
In support of this conclusion Associate Attorney General Crump noted
that the State Bar was created as an "agency of the State;" that the APA
defined "agency" broadly; and that the legislature had not specifically
exempted the State Bar. 16 2 Acknowledging that other entities, like the
Supreme Court of North Carolina and the General Assembly, were also
agencies of the state, 163 Attorney Crump reasoned that the APA targeted
agency rulemaking, a power which the General Assembly had delegated to
the Bar." Commenting on the relationship between the State Bar and the
General Assembly, Attorney Crump noted that the State Bar was a creature
of the legislature "[s]ubject to [its] superior authority," 165 and that "the
debates of the organizers of our bar seem to indicate that they believed that
legislative action was required to organize the Bar."1 66
Referencing the supreme court's veto power over the passage of State
Bar rules,16' Attorney Crump concluded that this provision did not
sufficiently involve the court "with the State Bar to make the Bar an agency
of the court rather than an agency which exercises its powers pursuant to
legislative command." 16 8
A few weeks later, on May 3, 1976, Attorney Crump sent the following
follow-up letter to the Secretary of the North Carolina State Bar:
Dear Mr. James:
Attached hereto please find the letter which I did for you sometime ago
concerning the application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the
North Carolina State Bar. This letter was circulated among the three
Senior Deputies and represents the best thinking of this Office on the
subject. We will be glad to work with you in any way that we can to
determine what needs to be filed by the State Bar and how best to go about
putting the material in an appropriate form for filing.169

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 1-3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4-6; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-9 (Supp. 1975).
Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 9, at 2-3.

166.

Id. at 2. See generally REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE

NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION, 29 REPORTS N.C. BAR ASS'N 134, 134-37 (H.M. London
ed., 1927).
167. Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 9, at 3.
168. Id.
169. Letter from David S. Crump, Assoc. Att'y Gen., Admin. Procedures Section, State of
N.C. Dep't of Justice, to B.E. James, Exec. Sec'y, N.C. State Bar (May 3, 1976) [hereinafter
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Minutes from the State Bar's July 1976 meeting indicate that Associate
Attorney General Crump appeared and presented the views of the Attorney
General's Office regarding the Administrative Procedure Act and its
possible application to the operations of the State Bar. 170 After receiving
Attorney Crump's report, the State Bar's Executive Committee
recommended that the Council appoint a special committee "to draft
amendments to [its] rules for presentment to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina to seek inclusion of the North Carolina State Bar and the North
Carolina Board of Law Examiners as part of the judicial branch of state
government."

71

Approximately six weeks later on August 30th, Rufus L. Edmisten, the
Attorney General at the time, signed a letter to the Honorable J. William
Copeland, the junior Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. 172 The letter reads: "In the opinion of this office, the North
Carolina State Bar could be found to be exempt from ... the Administrative
'those
Procedure Act, as [the Act] excludes from the definition of 'agency,'
1 73
government."'
state
the
of
branches
agencies in the . .. judicial
Found with the letter in state archives was a spiral bound notebook
containing the State Bar's position paper in support of their intention to be
declared a part of the judicial branch. 174 There is no evidence to suggest
that Justice Copeland or any other member of the supreme court responded
to this statement-that the State Bar could be found to be an agency of the
judicial branch. 17 s But, this comes as no surprise since the letter was
worded as a statement rather than a request for the court to take action.176
Letter dated May 3, 1976, from David S. Crump to B.E. James]. Except for the cover page, this
letter from Attorney Crump to the State Bar is identical to the April 15, 1976, eight-page letter.
See Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 9.
170. Unpublished Minutes of N.C. State Bar Council Meeting (July 1976), supra note 158.
171. Id.
172. Letter from Rufus L. Edmisten, Att'y Gen., N.C. Dep't of Justice, to The Hon. William
Copeland, Assoc. J., N.C. (Aug. 30, 1976) [hereinafter Letter dated Aug. 30, 1976, from Rufus L.
Edmisten to Justice Copeland] (on file with author and available in the Appendix).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. N.C. State Bar Memorandum found alongside Letter from Rufus L. Edmisten, Att'y
Gen., N.C. Dep't of Justice, to The Hon. William Copeland, Assoc. J., N.C. (Aug. 30, 1976)
[hereinafter N.C. State Bar Memorandum found alongside Justice Copeland Letter] (on file with
author and available in the Appendix). A photocopy of this spiral-bound notebook was found on
Aug. 5, 2015. Id. The notebook begins with the word "Preamble," which appears to be a
proposed amendment to the North Carolina State Bar's Certificate of Organization. Id. The
proposed preamble amendment is followed by a nine-page positiod paper signed by four State Bar
Councilors and the Secretary. Id. Five appendices follow the position paper. Id.
175. Telephone Interview with David S. Crump, Retired Att'y, N.C. State Bar (June 2, 2014).
During the interview, Mr. Crump stated that as far as he knew, neither Justice Copeland nor the
Supreme Court of North Carolina responded to the August 30, 1976, letter that was sent to Justice
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Two days later on the first of September, a letter was drafted by
Howard Kramer, the Deputy Attorney General for Legal Affairs.177
Attorney Kramer's letter, in its entirety, reads: 178
In the opinion of this Office, the North Carolina State Bar is found to be
exempt from chapter 150A of the General statutes for the reason that the
Administrative Procedure Act, 150A-2(1), excludes from the definition of
agency "those agencies in the . . .judicial branches of State Government,"
and in our opinion the North Carolina State Bar is a member of the judicial
branch. 179
Important to note here is that the letter addressed to the supreme court
informed the court that it could find the State Bar as part of the judicial
branch, while the letter addressed to the State Bar declared that in the
opinion of the Office of the Attorney General, the State Bar was part of the
judicial branch and exempt from the APA.18s
The letters from Attorney Crump and Attorney Kramer highlight the
ambiguity of government branch assignment for State Bar and the Board.' 8
Attorney Kramer's letter is the clearest attempt to locate the North Carolina
State Bar within the judicial branch of government. What is not clear,
however, is whether the Office of the Attorney General possessed the
authority to make such a call.182
Three months later, during the State Bar's October 1976 meeting, a
report concerning the State Bar's government branch assignment declared
that the Attorney General had ruled that the State Bar was exempt from the
provisions of the APA. 183 Using this ruling concerning the State Bar, the
Board of Law Examiners would soon withdraw its APA-compliant rules.

Copeland from the Office of the Attorney General. Id. The inability to locate any evidence of a
court response after conducting thorough research suggests Mr. Crump's claim is a credible one.
Id.
176. See Letter dated Aug. 30, 1976, from Rufus L. Edmisten to Justice Copeland, supra
note 172.
177. Letter dated Sept. 1, 1976, from Howard A. Kramer to B.E. James, supra note 9.
178. Id.
179. Id. ("[I]n our opinion the North Carolina State Bar is a member of the judicial branch.").

180. Id.
181. Compare Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to BE. James, supra note 9
(reasoning the State Bar is not within the Judicial Branch), with Letter dated Sept. 1, 1976, from
Howard A. Kramer to B.E. James, supra note 9 (reasoning the State Bar is within the Judicial
Branch).
182. Attorney General opinions are advisory in nature and not binding on a court. See In re
J.E., 643 S.E.2d 70, 72 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that Attorney General opinions have an
inherent "non-binding nature").
183. Unpublished Minutes of N.C. State Bar Council Meeting (October 21, 1976), supra note
158 ("Your executive committee reports that the Attorney General has ruled that the State Bar is
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The Board of Law Examiners Withdraws Its APA-Compliant
Rules

The fall of 1976 would prove to be eventful for both the North Carolina
State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners. 18 4 For the Board of Law
Examiners, September of 1976 included new litigation.s5 The case of
Mitchiner v. North Carolina Board of Law Examiners involved an
examinee who had taken, but not passed, the July 1976 bar exam. 1 6 In
September 1976, the examinee requested a contested case hearing pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act 87 and the Board's recently filed APAcompliant rules," which provided for such hearings "without undue
delay." 89 After six weeks passed without a hearing being scheduled, the
examinee filed a petition and application in superior court, seeking an order
compelling the Board to grant his request." The Board, now being
represented by Associate Attorney General David Crump from the APA
Division, filed its response on December 6, 1976.191 In the response, the
Board asserted that while it was an agency of the state it operated as a part
of the judicial branch of government. 192 For this reason, the Board claimed
to be exempt from the APA, despite its new APA-compliant rules. 193
Referencing the binding nature of the Board's own rules, the court
remanded the matter to the Board for further proceedings in compliance
with such rules. 194 But in so doing, the court addressed, in its unpublished
order, the government branch assignment question for the Board of Law
Examiners. 195
part of the judicial branch of State government and exempt from the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act.") (emphasis added).

184. See infra text accompanying notes 185-208.
185. See Mitchiner v. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 76 CvS 5386 (N.C. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 20, 1976)
(order remanding to Board of Law Examiners for further proceedings) (unpublished and not
available through mainstream electronic databases).
186. See Mitchiner, 76 CvS 5386.

187. See Petition and Application for Order, Mitchiner, 76 CvS 5386, para. 4, at 1-2.
188. See Amendment to Petition and Application, Mitchiner, 76 CvS 5386, at 1.
189. See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 30.1201-.1202 (1976) (withdrawn 1977) ("Rules Governing

Admission to the Practice of Law") (stating, "[u]pon receipt of request for a hearing by any party
to a contested case, the [Board's] secretary will promptly acknowledge said request and schedule a
hearing").
190. See Petition and Application for Order, supra note 187.
191. See Respondent's Answer, Mitchiner, 76 CvS 5386.
192. See id. at 3 (under Fourth Defense).
193. Id.
194. See Mitchiner, 76 CvS 5386 (order remanding to Board of Law Examiners for further
proceedings).
195. See id.
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The court concluded that both the North Carolina State Barl 96 and the
Board of Law Examiners "are a part of the judicial branch of
government." 97 In support of its conclusion, the court made several
findings.198 First, the trial court found that the State Bar and the Board "are
agencies of the state." t" It also found that the General Assembly possesses
the authority to set standards for admission to the bar,200 stating that setting
standards was "an appropriate legislative function," but that "application of
those [standards] to a specific applicant to be admitted to the North
Carolina Bar is a judicial act and function." 201
Based on this finding alone-that admission to the bar is a "judicial
act"-the court concluded that the State Bar and the Board were part of the
judicial branch.202 Essentially, the court claimed that because the actual
admission of an applicant to the bar was a "judicial act," that the
rulemaking agency charged with examining and investigating applicants
was within the judicial branch of government. 2 03 This logic ambiguity 20
found in the unpublished December 1976 Mitchiner order is indicative of
the type of logic ambiguities that several other bodies have made when
trying to locate the State Bar or the Board within a particular branch of
government. 20 s The Mitchiner matter would end without a trial or
published opinion.206 Its only trace would be an unpublished trial court
order remanding the matter to the Board of Law Examiners for further
proceedings,207 which would never take place.20 8

196. The North Carolina State Bar was not a named party in this action.
197. See Mitchiner, 76 CvS 5386, at 2 (order denying permissive intervention).
198. See id. at 1-2.
199. See id. at 1.
200. See id. at 2.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 2-3.
203. See supra note 12 (laying out the ambiguity of phrases like "judicial act" and "judicial
function," which may have multiple meanings).
204. North Carolina's State Constitution provides, "The judicial power of the State shall,
except as provided in section 3 . .. , be vested in a .. . General Court of Justice. See N.C. CONST.
art. IV, § 1. Section three reads: "The General Assembly may vest in administrative agencies
established pursuant to law such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to

the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were created." See id. § 3. At best,
the phrase "judicial act" is ambiguous in light of these provisions, with its meaning reflecting the
function of adjudication, rather than an assigned government branch.
205. See, e.g., LegalZoom, 2014 WL 1213242, at *7-9 (N.C. Super. Mar. 24, 2014).
206. See Mitchiner, 76 CvS 5386 (order remanding to Board of Law Examiners for further
proceedings).
207. See id.

208. Interview with Joseph Mitchiner, Attorney, in Raleigh, N.C. (July 2014).
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Six months later, on July 14, 1977, the Board of Law Examiners sent a
letter to the Office of the Attorney General.2 09 In the letter, the Board
advised the Attorney General that it no longer considered itself subject to
the Administrative Procedure Act and was withdrawing the rules it had filed
with the Office eighteen months prior.2 10 Supporting its own decision to
withdraw its rules and consider itself exempt from the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Board cited its consideration of Deputy Attorney
General Howard Kramer's September 1, 1976, letter that located the North
Carolina State Bar in the judicial branch of government and the December
1976 unpublished trial court order issued in the Mitchiner case.211
On July 27, 1977, the Attorney General responded to the Board of Law
Examiners' letter.2 12 The Attorney General's letter in response reads:
This will acknowledge receipt of and thank you for your letter of 14 July
1977 advising me that the Board of Law Examiners is withdrawing the
rules filed with my office under the Administrative Procedure Act, and
that the Board no longer considers itself subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act.
In light of the opinion rendered by my office on 1 September 1976 which
concluded that the State Bar was exempt from Chapter 150A of the
General Statutes of North Carolina, I concur with the recent action of the
Board of Law Examiners.2 13
As demonstrated here, the enactment of the state's first APA214 was a
significant, even identity-shifting, event for North Carolina's government
agencies.2 15 For the State Bar and the Board, it appears that the value of not
having a branch assignment was, at this point in time, outweighed by the
value of having one. From this point forward, they would maintain their
claim to be part of the judicial branch of government. 2 16

209. See Letter from Fred P. Parker III, Exec. Sec'y, N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, to Rufus L.
Edmisten, Att'y Gen., State of N.C. Dep't of Justice (July 14, 1977) [hereinafter Letter dated July
14, 1977, from Fred P. Parker III to Rufus L. Edmisten] (on file with author and included in the
Appendix).
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. Letter dated July 27, 1977, from Rufus L. Edmisten to Fred P. Parker III, supra note 147.

213. Id.
214. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT.
215. See supra Section I.C.
216. See Lunsford, supra note 13.

§ 150A (Supp.

1974).
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D. Operatingand Developing Under a Claim to be Judicial

.

The Attorney General would keep the September 1976 letter to the
State Bar and the July 1977 letter to the Board of Law Examiners private.217
Three months after the Attorney General sent the July 1977 letter
"concurring" with the Board of Law Examiners claims to be judicial, the
Office of the Attorney General published a formal opinion in response to a
series of inquiries, two of which asked about the legal status for the North
Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners.2 18 In the formal,
published opinion, the Office of the Attorney General stated:
The North Carolina State Bar is an agency of the State of North Carolina.
. . The Board of Law Examiners is a separate but related state
administrative agency with judicial and legislative powers relating to
admission to the practice of law.2 19
The opinion does not mention a government branch.2 20 Nor does the
opinion reference the recent, yet unpublished, legal status letters that were
sent to the State Bar and the Board. 2 21 The October 1977 Opinion is
significant in terms of inter-organizational ambiguities of identity and status
as it captures the complexity of the relationship between "separate but
related administrative agencies."2 22
Thus it comes as no surprise that with Deputy Attorney General
Kramer's 1976 opining on the State Bar's government branch kept private,
the State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners continued with some
frequency to be treated like other professional regulators subject to
legislative oversight. 223 For example, in 1977 the General Assembly
created the Government Evaluation Commission, also known as the Sunset
Commission. 224 The Commission was charged with evaluating existing

217. See infra notes 218-222 and accompanying text.
218. See J.K. Sherron, Jr., 47 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 101, 1977 WL 26213, at *1-2 (1977)
(identifying a missed opportunity in Oct. 1977 to clarify the governmental branch assignment
question for the State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners in a published Attorney General
opinion).
219. Id. (citing Keenan v. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 n.5 (E.D.N.C. 1970)).
220. Id
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-34.10 (1979) (repealed 1981) (creating a Sunset
Commission that would evaluate all of North Carolina's administrative agencies, including the
North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners).
224. See id.
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state regulatory bodies,225 and recommending whether their continued
existence was warranted.2 26
Soon after its creation, the Sunset Commission evaluated both the
North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners. 227 The
Commission concluded that the continued existence of the State Bar and the
Board was warranted, 22 8 but noted that neither the Bar nor the Board
provided for notice-and-comment-type rulemaking procedures, lifetime
term limits for its governing members, or substantial participation by nonlawyers.229
The Commission also noted concerns about a late 1979 Board of Law
Examiners rule change that altered the dates of the bar exam, the costs for
applicants to sit for the exam, and its rules for allowing applicants access to
bar exam scoring data. 230 Based on its study, the Sunset Commission
recommended that the Bar and the Board operate with greater transparency
and increased public participation. 23 1 The Commission, however, was met
with significant resistance and is not considered in retrospect to have had a
substantial impact in the agency evaluation and adequate oversight
endeavor.232
Two years after the Sunset Commission issued its report, the question,
to which branch of government do the bar and board belong arose in

225. See id.
226. See id. ("The General Assembly finds that the state government actions have produced a

substantial increase in numbers and agencies, growth of programs, and proliferation of rules and
regulations and that the whole process developed without sufficient legislative oversight,
regulatory accountability, or a system of checks and balances.")
227. See Gov'T EVALUATION COMM'N, FINAL COMMISSION REPORT NORTH CAROLINA
STATE BAR 1-44 (1980).
228. See id. at 1.

229. See id. at 2, 24.
230. See id.

231. See id. at 15. A similar recommendation was echoed in a December 2014 report on
Occupational Licensing Agencies presented by the Program Evaluation Division of the North
Carolina General Assembly. See OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AGENCIES SHOULD NOT BE
CENTRALIZED, BUT STRONGER OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED, supra note 22.
232. MICHAEL CROWELL & MILTON S. HEATH, JR., THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH
CAROLINA: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATORS 96-102 (1981). Versions of a few early
recommendations made their way into statutory amendments. See, e.g., An Act to Amend Chapter
84 of the General Statutes of North Carolina Relating to the North Carolina State Bar and to
Remove Article 4 of that Chapter from the Automatic Termination Provisions of G.S. 143-34.12,
ch. 788, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1162 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17 (2015)
(adding three public members to the North Carolina State Bar Council, its governing body,
thirteen months after the government evaluation commission report suggested that one third of the
Council be comprised of public members).
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litigation again, this time making its way to North Carolina's high court.233
The context of the litigation was an attorney disciplinary case. 231' The North
Carolina State Bar had instituted disciplinary action against attorney Harry
DuMont. 235
That action was heard before the then newly formed
Disciplinary Hearing Commission,23 6 which issued an order of discipline on
March 3, 1980, suspending Mr. Dumont from the active practice of law for
six months.237 Attorney DuMont appealed the Commission's order,
bringing into question the proper standard of judicial review for a final
decision made by the State Bar's Disciplinary Hearing Commission, an
issue of first impression.238
The supreme court recognized the novelty and significance of this
question.239 In fact, the case was resolved on grounds that did not require
the court to address this novel issue, but the court chose to do so anyway.240
Supporting its action in deciding an issue beyond what was required to
resolve the dispute, the court noted the "serious conflict in contentions"
between the parties, stating the resolution of the question would provide
future guidance to the State Bar and its Disciplinary Hearing
Commission. 241
The standard of review question that had sparked such serious
contentions relates to the nature of the State Bar's status and functions as
well as to the degree of oversight that the agency receives.242 In resolving
the proper standard of review, the court first examined the enabling statutes
that created the North Carolina State Bar and the Disciplinary Hearing
Commission. 243 The court found that within these statutes there was no
adequate procedure for judicial review.2" Consequently, the court held that
the Administrative Procedure Act's provisions for judicial review were
controlling and that the "whole record" test, not the "any competent
evidence" test, was the proper standard. 245 Thus, the court effectively
subjected the State Bar's Disciplinary Hearing Commission to the same
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See N.C. State Bar v. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89, 91 (N.C. 1982).
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 90.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28.1 (1975).
See DuMont, 286 S.E.2d at 91.
Id. at 91-93.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section m.B.2.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-15.
See DuMont, 286 S.E.2d at 98.
See id.
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type of judicial oversight that most other agencies within the executive
branch of government receive.246
In litigating the standard of review issue, the State Bar argued that the
Administrative Procedure Act and its whole record test did not apply
because the State Bar and the Disciplinary Hearing Commission were not
part of the executive branch of government.2 47 in response, the court
refused to comment on the State Bar's branch assignment, but found the
State Bar's argument "unpersuasive."24 8
In essence, the court's opinion makes known that the State Bar's
Disciplinary Hearing Commission functions like an agency in the executive
branch of government and its actions, regardless of formal branch
assignment, are subject to APA-like requirements.2 49 This functional
treatment of State Bar action, as being subject to the type of judicial
oversight set forth in the APA, has broader applications. 25 0
Presumably prompted by the court's opinion in the DuMont case, a
handwritten note was added to the State Bar's September 1976 letter from
Attorney Kramer-the letter claiming the State Bar is a part of the judicial
The note questionS2 52 Attorney Kramer's
branch of government.2 51
assertion that the North Carolina State Bar "is found to be exempt from
Chapter 150A of the General Statutes . . . and in our opinion the North
Carolina State Bar is a member of the judicial branch." 253 The handwriting
reads:
Mr. James-Looks like the Supreme Court disagrees w/ Kramer. See
Dumont, 304 N.C. at pp 642-643 Tx, CB 254
A review of the note's identified pages in the Dumont opinion confirms
that the note refers to that portion of the opinion where the court
commented that the State Bar's argument about being within the judicial

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id.; see, e.g., Lunsford, supra note 13.
See DuMont, 286 S.E.2d at 98.
See id.
See generallyid. at 98-99.
In that same opinion, the supreme court stated that it "should not meddle in matters [that

had been] left to the State Bar by [the] Legislature." Id. at 92. This statement suggests that the
supreme court considers the State Bar to be a creature of the legislature and not necessarily the
judicial branch entity that the State Bar believes itself to be.
251. Letter dated Sept. 1, 1976, from Howard A. Kramer to B.E. James, supra note 9 ("[lI]n
our opinion the North Carolina State Bar is a member of the judicial branch.").
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. (handwritten note) (CB stands for Carolin Bakewell who was in the Office of the
Counsel for the North Carolina State Bar at the time).
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branch was unpersuasive. 2" But again, the court resolved the Dumont case
on grounds not requiring it to reach the standard of review question.256
This note confirms that the Attorney General's attempt to locate the
State Bar within the judicial branch was likely without final authority 257 and
is not necessarily consistent with the supreme court's view on the matter.25 8
While the note explicitly acknowledges inconsistent opinions about the
legal status of the State Bar, its presence marks a larger issue of inadequate
agency oversight as the supreme court reached a different conclusion than
the Attorney General's Office.259
Questions about the State Bar's
compliance with APA-like procedures would rise again; this time the
context would be admission to the bar.260
In June 1995, Attorney Ellen Bring petitioned the State Bar for
approval of a new law school to be added to the Council's approved list of
law schools. 26 1 Graduates of law schools that appeared on the Council's list
satisfied the Board's legal education requirements to be eligible to sit for
the bar examination. In July 1995, the Council denied Ms. Bring's
application, despite the fact that Ms. Bring had practiced law in good
standing in another state for fifteen years.262
Relevant to note here is that up until 1971, the Board of Law
Examiners made the approval of law school decisions.2 63 In 1968, the
Board amended its rules to provide that it would delegate the approval of
law schools task to the State Bar beginning in 1971 .26 According to the
Board's amended rules, the State Bar Council's list of approved law schools
would be available in the office of Secretary.265 In 1971, the singlesecretary provision was still in effect, rendering the location of the list of

255. Compare id. ("In the opinion of [the Office of the Attorney General]. . . the North
Carolina State Bar is a member of the judicial branch."), with DuMont, 286 S.E.2d at 98-88
(finding unpersuasive the State Bar's arguments that the Bar and the Disciplinary Hearing
Commission were not within the executive branch of government).
256. See DuMont, 286 S.E.2d at 98-99.
257. See Letter dated Sept. 1, 1976, from Howard A. Kramer to B.E. James, supra note 9.
258. See id.
259. See id.; see also infra Sections IlI.B, IV.A, V.B.
260. Bring v. N.C. State Bar, 501 S.E.2d 907, 908 (N.C. 1998).
261. See id.
262. See id. at 907-12.
263.

See, e.g., RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, published in 243

N.C. 785 app. at 789 (1956).
264.

See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, published in 275 N.C.

692 app. at 697, 701 (1968) (indicating that the approval of law schools, beginning with the 1971
bar examination, would be managed by the State Bar Council).
265. See Bring, 501 S.E.2d at 909 ("A list of the approved law schools is available in the
office of the secretary." (quoting Rules GoverningAdmission to the Practice ofLaw .0702)).
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approved law schools immaterial, since the same secretary who served the
State Bar also served the Board.266
But in 1995, when Ms. Bring petitioned the State Bar Council for
approval of the law school from where she graduated, separate secretaries
served the State Bar and the Board.267 In addition, by 1995, the State Bar
had ceased approving law schools on a case-by-case basis; instead, the
Bar's policy was to allow only those applicants who had graduated from an
ABA-accredited law school to sit for the exam.268
Presumably because the task of approving law schools now resided
with the State Bar Council, Ms. Bring brought suit against the North
Carolina State Bar,269 not the Board of Law Examiners.2 70 Ms. Bring, who
had graduated from a law school that was fully accredited in another state,
challenged the State Bar Council's list of only ABA-approved law schools
on constitutional and procedural grounds.271 Ms. Bring did not succeed in

266. Compare An Act to Provide for the Organization as an Agency of the State of North
Carolina of the North Carolina State Bar, and for Its Regulation, Powers, and Government,
Including the Admission of Lawyers to Practice and Their Discipline and Disbarment, ch. 210,
1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 313 (establishing that a single secretary would serve both the State Bar and
the Board), with An Act to Amend G.S. § 84-24 Pertaining to the Board of Law Examiners, ch.
13, 1973 Sess. Laws 6 (providing "The Board of Law Examiners . .. may employ an Executive
Secretary.... This act shall be in full force and effect ... this the 12th day of February, 1973").
267. See id.
268. See Bring, 501 S.E.2d at 908. Although Ms. Bring's request-to take the North Carolina
Bar Examination was denied in 1995, twenty years later, the North Carolina State Bar reversed
course, amending its rules to allow applicants in the same situation as Ms. Bring to sit for the
North Carolina Bar Exam. See 27 N.C. Admin. Code 01C.0105 (2016) (amended effective March
5, 2015) (allowing an applicant to take the North Carolina bar examination if the applicant holds a
"J.D. degree from a law school that was approved for licensure purposes in another state ...
was
licensed in such state . . . , and, at the time of the application for admission to the North Carolina
State Bar, has been an active member in good standing of the bar in that state ... in each of the 10
years immediately preceding application"). Unlike in 1995, when facts like these sparked a legal
battle that divided the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the 2015 rule changes appeared to come
about without noticeable debate. Pending before the state supreme court for approval in January
2016 is another proposed rule change-this one initiated by the Board of Law Examiners rather
than the State Bar-that will eliminate 10 year requirement from the 2015 approval of law schools
rule. See ProposedRule Amendments, N.C. STATE BAR, http://www.ncbar.gov/rules/proprul.asp
(last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
269. See id. at 907.
270. Interesting to note, but beyond the scope of this Article, is whether the Board's delegation
to the State Bar of the approval of law schools task is within its intended scope of authority
delegated by the General Assembly. See generally F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick,
The Non-ReDelegation Doctrine, 55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163 (2013) (calling into question the
legality of an agency re-delegating its legislatively-delegated tasks).
271. See id. at 907-10, 912.

2016]

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY

6667

making her claims and she was not allowed to take the North Carolina bar
examination.272
Specifically, the state's supreme court found that the General
Assembly's enabling statutes did not violate the non-delegation doctrine.27 3
Additionally, a majority of the court found Ms. Bring's argument that the
State Bar did not create its approved law school list under APA procedures
irrelevant. 2 74 According to the court, the State Bar's original rulemaking
authority provision provided more specific rulemaking instructions than the
APA, and those specific "directions must govern over the general rulemaking provision of the APA."27 5 Relevant here is the fact that the majority
did not base its decision on the State Bar's government branch
assignment.2 76 Rather, the court based its decision on the State Bar's
enabling statutes containing a process that included supreme court
publication and approval of the State Bar and the Board's rules.277 The
court would have ruled the same way for any executive branch agency or
independent licensing board, as "the specific trumps the general" is the rule
for this administrative law question and it does not relate to government
branch assignment. 2 78 As discussed below, although the supreme court veto
provides some oversight, it is inadequate, as this procedural process does
not allow for public participation or foster principles of open government at
the time these rules are made-a key to maintaining democratic
legitimacy. 279 Thus, as in Dumont, the court 280 again remained silent about
whether the North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners
were part of the judicial branch of government.281

272. Id. at 910.
273. Id.
274. Id. (citing Nat'l Food Stores v. N.C. Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 151 S.E.2d 582, 585-86
(1966)).
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. See Nat'l Food Stores, 151 S.E.2d at 586.
279. Bring, 501 S.E.2d at 910; see David Arkush, Democracy and AdministrativeLegitimacy,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 611, 620 (2012) (discussing democratic legitimacy).
280. See Bring, 501 S.E.2d at 910. As of March 2015, currently pending before the Supreme
Court of North Carolina is a proposed change for the Rules of the North Carolina State Bar. That
proposal, which was approved by the State Bar's executive committee in October 2014 would
create an exception that would allow applicants in the same situation as Ms. Bring to sit for the
North Carolina Bar Exam.
281. See also Telephone Interview with David S. Crump, supra note 175 (affirming lack of
response to the Justice Copeland letter).
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III. BOUNDARY BUREAUCRACIES: MAPPING AMBIGUITIES AND CHARTING
IMPLICATIONS

The previous section provided extensive background information on
the creation and development of the North Carolina State Bar and the Board
of Law Examiners. This part maps three boundary-related ambiguities:
"separate, but related"282 administrative agencies (inter-organizational);2 83
the tripartite branches of government (intra-governmental);2 84 and the
public and private sectors (public-private).2 8 5 As administrative law scholar
Anne Joseph O'Connell notes in Bureaucracy at the Boundary, "labels"
matter. 286 Part III confirms that labels do matter and explains how
boundary bureaucracies can take shape at the state level in the context of
regulating the legal profession.287 The goal here is to map the interorganizational, intra-governmental, and public-private ambiguities, not
necessarily resolve them. In other words, Part III highlights the "fish or
fowl" ambiguities by contrasting the evidence of one label with evidence of
another.
In addition to mapping ambiguities, this section reveals the dynamic
nature of agencies as they develop or "drift," over time. 2 88 As used here,
"agency drift" refers to shifts in agency identity and position over the
course of the agency's existence. 289 This evolutionary phenomenon
seemingly transforms what was, at one time, distinct into the obscure. 290 1
begin by mapping the inter-organizational boundary, for two reasons: First,
this ambiguity keenly illustrates the phenomenon of agency drift, 29 1 and
second, inter-organizational ambiguity must be resolved before turning to
the other boundaries.

282. See Sherron, supra note 218, at *2.
283. See infra notes 292-348 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 349-389 and accompanying text.
285. See infra notes 390-417 and accompanying text.
286. See O'Connell, supra note 21, at 894.
287. See infra notes 292-417 and accompanying text.
288. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight?
Transparencyin the AdministrativeState, 76 U. CI. L. REv. 1157, 1170 (2009).
289. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 21, at 871-74.
290. See id.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 288-290.
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The Inter-OrganizationalBoundary: How Do the State Bar and the
Board Relate?
1.

A "Separate but Related" Ambiguity

The "Separate, but related"2 92 phrase, while seemingly convoluted,
captures the complex nature of the relationship between the North Carolina
State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners.29 3 In both form and function,
the State Bar and the Board remain simultaneously distinct and interdependent. There remains a lack of clarity about the extent to which their
relationship is, or once was, lateral or hierarchical.294 On one hand, the
relationship could be seen as hierarchical, with the Board of Law Examiners
acting as one subservient part of the State Bar.295 On the other hand, the
Bar and Board could be viewed as two separate entities, interacting only
when their separate purposes overlap,2 96 with the Board of Law Examiners
overseeing those who wish to be admitted to the Bar and the State Bar
With respect to the inter-organizational
overseeing those admitted.
boundary between the State Bar and the Board, one thing is clear: confusion
abounds.297

292. See Sherron, supra note 218 (describing the Board of Law Examiners, vis-A-vis the North

Carolina State Bar, as "a separate but related state administrative agency with judicial and
legislative powers relating to admission to the practice of law").
293. See infra notes 298-348 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 298-343 and accompanying text.
295. See infra notes 298-323 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 324-343 and accompanying text.
297. See Lunsford, supra note 13, at 6 ("[Q]uite a few folks, including many aspiring
attorneys, appear to believe that we're the North Carolina Board of Law Examiners[,] ... [and]
[tihough [the State Bar] famously takes licenses for various reasons, including professional
misconduct, it does not admit anyone to the legal profession. That is the exclusive province of the
Board of Law Examiners."). But see 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 01C.0103 (2015) (State Bar Rule
titled, Admission to Practice, and instructing on admission subsequent to receiving a license from
the Board of Law Examiners); 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 01C.0105 (2015) (titled, Approval of Law
Schools, and setting educational requirement standards for admission to the bar). See also
OCCUPATIONAL

LICENSING AGENCIES

SHOULD

NOT BE CENTRALIZED,

BUT STRONGER

OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED, supra note 22, at 16 (treating the State Bar and Board of Law Examiners
jointly, and as an occupational licensing agency, for its purpose of studying independent North
Carolina government entities charged with professional regulation); see also JOAN G. BRANNON,
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NORTH CAROLINA 28 (1977) ("The North Carolina State Bar is the
official organization of attorneys for the state. This organization, through its Board of Law
Examiners, licenses attorneys.") (emphasis added). Indeed, there is no shortage of historical
material suggesting a hierarchical relationship between the State Bar and the Board. Similarly,
there is no shortage of evidence establishing the intra-governmental ambiguity as well. See id. at
Contents (placing the North Carolina State Bar, within the publication's table of contents, among
private organizations, such as the North Carolina Bar Association and the North Carolina
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Evidence of a HierarchicalRelationship

Some historical evidence suggests that the original relationship
between the North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners was
intended to be hierarchical. 298 Four reasons support such an interpretation,
many of which are derived from features within the original organizing
Act. 299 These include: (1) the single-secretary provision; 3m (2) plain
language of the organizing Act; 30 1 (3) the supervisory role for the State Bar
over the Board;30 2 and (4) the structure of both the original and codified
versions of the Act.303
First, in the original organizing Act, the General Assembly provided
for a single secretary to serve both the State Bar and the Board. 304 "[T]he
secretary of the North Carolina State Bar shall be the secretary of the Board,
and serve without additional pay." 35 This provision remained in effect
from 1933 until 1973 .306 The single-secretary provision evinces the General
Assembly's intent for the State Bar's hierarchical role over the Board.307
This provision is not included in the Bar Association's proposed version of
the bill that it submitted to the Association's members during the 1932
annual meeting.308
Second, the plain language from the Act further supports the claim that
the intended structure for the entities was envisioned in a more hierarchical
form. The original Act reads: "The [State Bar] Council shall be competent
to exercise the entire powers . . . in respect to the interpretation and
3
administration of this Act."o

This same language remains to this day. 3 10

Association of Clerks of Superior Court and not under table of contents headings such as: The
General CourtofJustice, Related Agencies (e.g., The Department of Justice)).
298. An Act to Provide For the Organization As An Agency of the State of North Carolina
State Bar, and For its Regulation Powers, and Government, Including the Admission of Lawyers
to Practice and Their Discipline and Disbarment, ch. 210, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 313 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (2015)).
299. Id. at 319.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 320.
303. See id. at 319; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-15 to -26 (2015).
304. 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319.
305. See id.
306. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (1965), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (1975). See
also 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319.
307. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319.
308.

See REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR

ASSOCIATION, supra note 90, at 199-213.
309. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 314-15.
310. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17 (2015).
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In addition, the General Assembly chose different words to describe the
nature of the State Bar and the Board.311 In creating the State Bar, the
General Assembly used the phrase "agency of the state."3 12 In contrast, the
General Assembly used the term "Board" when creating the Board of Law
Examiners.313 This difference in terminology suggests a relationship that is
not necessarily of a lateral status.
Third, though the General Assembly concurrently created the State Bar
and the Board to oversee the entirety of North Carolina's legal profession,
from licensing to retirement, it tasked the State Bar with supervisory
authority over the Board of Law Examiners.3 14 Statutory language has
always directed the Council of the State Bar to elect the members of the
Board of Law Examiners.315 Furthermore, the Council must approve the
Board's rules before those rules are forwarded to the supreme court for final
approval.316
Finally, the structure of the original Act and currently existing
codification suggests a hierarchal relationship, with the State Bar having
superior powers over the Board of Law Examiners. Thus, as codified, the
enabling statutes for the State Bar and Board appear within a single Article
of Chapter 84, titled, North CarolinaState Bar.3 17 In addition to the title of
the Article, the first statute appearing within the article, is titled, Creationof
North Carolina State Bar as Agency of the State.3 18 Nowhere within the
Article 4 Table of Contents is there parallel language evincing the creation
of, or lateral form for, the Board of Law Examiners.319 Rather, the General
Assembly titled the statute that creates the Board of Law Examiners,
3 20
Further, in both the original session law and
Admission to Practice.
current statutory codification, provisions creating the State Bar precede
those that create the Board of Law Examiners.32' In addition, the provisions

311. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-15, with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24.
312. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 313; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-15.
313. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24.
314. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319-20.
315. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24.
316. See id.
317. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-15 to -38.
318. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-15.
319. See id.
320. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24.
321. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-15 to -38. The session law creating the State Bar
and the Board is titled "An Act to Provide for the Organization as an Agency of the State of North
Carolina of the North Carolina State Bar, and for Its Regulation, Powers, and Government,
Including the Admission of Lawyers, to Practice and Their Discipline and Disbarment." 1933
N.C. Sess. Laws at 313 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-24 to -38 (2015)).
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regarding the Board of Law Examiners are not set off from the rest of the
statutory scheme.3 22 Rather, they are flanked on both sides by ten or more
statutes regarding the power of the State Bar.3 23
ii. Evidence of a LateralRelationship
Conversely, there is also evidence that rather than being subservient to
the State Bar, the Board of Law Examiners is instead a lateral organization
that is, indeed, "separate but related." 324 Like the evidence supporting a
hierarchical relationship, evidence supporting this interpretation-that the
State Bar and the Board relate on a more lateral level-is found in the plain
language of the organizing Act and subsequent amendments thereto.325
Additionally, evidence supporting this interpretation comes from the
independent actions of both the State Bar and the Board.3 2 6
First, despite the fact that the General Assembly granted the State Bar
supervisory powers over the Board of Law Examiners, it also unmistakably
granted independent rulemaking authority to both the Bar and the Board.3 27
The current provision delegating rulemaking authority to the State Bar
reads:
The Council shall be competent to exercise the entire powers of the North
Carolina State Bar in respect of the interpretation and administration of
this Article.3 28 The rules and regulations adopted by the Council under
this Article may be amended by the Council from time to time in any
manner not inconsistent with this Article. 329

322. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT.
sections 84-24 to -25).

§§ 84-15 to -38 (governing admission to the bar are

323. See id.

324. Sherron, supranote 218 (citing Keenan v. Bd ofL. Exam'rs, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 n.5
(E.D.N.C. 1970)).
325. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 313 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-15
to -38 (2015)).

326. See, e.g., Regulation Certification from N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs filed with N.C. Office
of Att'y Gen. Admin. Procedures Section on Jan. 30, 1976, supra note 140. Letter dated Apr. 15,

1976, from David S. Crump, to B.E. James, supra note 9. Letter dated May 3, 1976, from David
S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 169.
327. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

84-21 (granting rulemaking authority to the State Bar); N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 84-24 (granting independent rulemaking authority to the Board of Law Examiners).
Rulemaking authority is not granted to any subdivision of the State Bar. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 84-3 (2015) (establishing the Disciplinary Hearing Commission as a separate adjudicatory
commission within the State Bar but not providing the Commission with independent rulemaking
authority).
328. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17.
329. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-21.
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Alongside thim delegation of rulemaking authority for the State Bar the
General Assembly delegated separate rulemaking authonty to the Board of
Law examiners. 330 The provision granting such authonty to the Board
reads.
The Board of Law examiners shall have full power and authority to make
or cause to be made such examinations and investigations as may be
deemed by it necessary to satisfy it that the applicants for admission to the
bar possess the qualifications of character and general fitness requisite for
an attorney and counselor-at-law. . . . The Board . . . subject to the
approval of the Council, shall by majority vote ... make, alter, and amend
such rules and regulations for admission to the bar as in their judgment
shall promote the welfare of the state and the profession."'

The General Assembly's delegation of independent rulemaking
authority to both the State Bar and the Board suggests a relationship
between the two that is more lateral, rather than hierarchal, in nature.
Moreover, the State Bar's authority to oversee the Board's rulemaking
power332 is limited to a veto power, and does not include the ability to make
substantive amendments.3 33 Having authority to oversee an agency's
actions does not necessarily mean that the entity tasked with oversight is
one in the same as the entity that is subject to the oversight.3 34
Further supporting a lateral relationship between the State Bar and the
Board is the General Assembly's amendment to the original staffing
structure of the Bar and the Board.335 The single-secretary provision
provided an internal connection between the entities.336 When the General
Assembly amended the single-secretary provision, to give the Board of Law
Examiners the power to employ its own secretary a more lateral relationship
between the entities emerged.337
Second, and in addition to the plain language set forth above,
independent actions of both the State Bar and the Board confirm that the
entities have seen themselves in both separate and related ways.338 As a

330.
331.
332.
333.

N.C. GEN. STAT.
Id.
Id.
See id.

§ 84-24.

334. See id. Other examples include a Presidential Veto of a Congressional Act. See U.S.
CONST. art. VII, § 7, cl. 2.
335. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319-20 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24
(2015)).
336. See id.

337. See 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws at 6 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (2015)).
338. See, e.g., Regulation Certification from N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs filed with N.C. Office
of Att'y Gen. Admin. Procedures Section on Jan. 30, 1976, supra note 140. Letter dated Apr. 15,
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practical matter, since being created, there have been periods of time during
which the State Bar and the Board have shared physical office space, as
well as times when they have not.339 Sharing office space does not have
legal implications for inter-organizational identity, but it can affect
perceived identity.
Third, the independent often conflicting actions of the entities
demonstrated their lateral relationship.3 40 As described previously, in 1976
the Board acted independently by filing APA-compliant rules with the
Office of the Attorney General.3 4 1 Additionally, the Bar's own rules note
the entities' separate, lateral nature. For example, in its original Certificate
of Organization, the State Bar promulgated rules forbidding anyone serving
as a member of the Council to simultaneously serve as a member of the
Board of Law Examiners.342 The rules further provide that the Bar and the
Board may jointly consider proposed rules, but "[n]o action, however, shall
be taken by the joint meeting but each shall act separately."3 43

1976, from David S. Crump, to B.E. James, supra note 9. Letter dated May 3, 1976, from David
S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 169.
339. Compare 289 N.C. 738 (1976) (stating the address for the Board of Law Examiners as
107 Fayetteville Street, P.O. Box 25427, Raleigh, N.C. 27611), and 298 N.C. 813 (1979) (stating
the address for the Board of Law Examiners as 208 Fayetteville Street, P.O. Box 25427, Raleigh,
N.C. 27611), with Letter dated May 3, 1976, from David S. Crump, to B.E. James, supra note
169, and Letter from L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Exec. Director, N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, to M.
Keith Kapp, President, N.C. State Bar (Apr. 12, 2013). See also Letter from Fred P. Parker III,
Exec. Sec'y, N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, to Elaine Marshall, N.C. Sec'y of State (Apr. 17, 2012)
[hereinafter Letter dated Apr. 17, 2012, from Fred P. Parker III to Elaine Marshall] (stating the
Board of Law Examiners was exempt from open meetings laws) (stating the address of the Board
of Law Examiners as One Exchange Plaza, Suite 700, P.O. Box 2946, Raleigh, N.C. 27602); The
N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, htts://ncble.org/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2015) (stating the current address
of the Board of Law Examiners as 5510 Six Forks Rd., Suite 300, Raleigh, N.C. 27609); N.C.
STATE BAR, http://www.ncbar.com/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2015) (stating the current address for the
State Bar as 217 E. Edenton Street, P.O. Box 25908, Raleigh, N.C. 27611).
340. See, e.g., Regulation Certification from N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs filed with N.C. Office
of Att'y Gen. Admin. Procedures Section on Jan. 30, 1976, supra note 140. Letter dated Apr. 15,
1976, from David S. Crump, to B.E. James, supra note 9. Letter dated May 3, 1976, from David
S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 169.
341. It is true that the Board withdrew its rules eighteen months later and cited the status of the
State Bar in support of its action in withdrawing the rules. Thus, it seemingly appears that the
Board acts separately when such separateness is organizationally advantageous, but leverages its
relatedness to the Bar when that aspect provides traction for Board goals. See, e.g., Brief for N.C.
State Bar et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S.
Ct. 1101 (2014) (No. 13-534). The Board of Law Examiners signed an amicus curiae brief written
by the State Bar, which featured procedural processes that although followed by the State Bar are
not necessarily features of the Board's processes. Id.
342. See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 01C.0101 (2015); see also Certificate of Organization of the
North Carolina State Bar, supra note 103, at 860.
343. Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar, supra note 103, at 860.
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Admittedly here, the rules of the State Bar that note the separateness
between the Bar and the Board are of its own making. Still, the weight of
evidence m support of each interpretation reveals a complex and ambiguous
relationship. making resolution of the ambiguity less intuitive than
expected.
2.

Implications at Inter-Organizational Borders

There are practical implications of the ambiguities of identity and
status related to the inter-organizational boundaries between the North
A primary
Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners.
implication is widespread confusion and misunderstanding about the nature
of the relationship between the Bar and the Board.344 Managing that
confusion has proved difficult.345 Thus, though the State Bar and the Board
might share the same views about the entities' separate nature, that same
separateness is difficult to discern by reading the statutory scheme that the
General Assembly enacted to create the Bar and the Board.
Moreover, statutory reporting obligations must sometimes be met by
referencing separate reports submitted by the State Bar and the Board.
Though most of the confusion causes no more than mild inefficiency,
practical implications can lead to problems.3 46
In addition to practical implications, the inter-organizational ambiguity
has potential legal implications. To the extent that the identities of the State
Bar and the Board are conflated, adjudicating bodies who "say what the law
is"3 47 might mistakenly presume that the law applies-or should applyequally to both entities. But over the past forty years, the operations of the
State Bar and the Board have not mirrored one another. The State Bar, for
example, has a lengthier record of engaging in public rulemaking,
complying with the open meetings laws, and fulfilling statutory duties with
respect to filing notices of regularly scheduled meetings.34 8

344. See, e.g., Lunsford, supra note 13.
345. See id.; see also Bring v. N.C. State Bar, 501 S.E.2d 907 (N.C. 1998); N.C. State Bar v.
DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89 (N.C. 1982).
346. Those problems are discussed in Part IV of this Article.
347. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
348. See, e.g., Brief for N.C. State Bar et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
341 (including the Board but arguing on procedures of the State Bar that differ from the Board's).
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The Intra-GovernmentalBoundary
1

A Branch Assignment Ambiguity

In addition to residing aiong inter-orgamzational Iounclaries, tie North
Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners reside along an intragovernmental boundary, specifically the boundary between the executive
and judicial branches of state government. 34 9 This boundary ambiguity
places the State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners without governmental
"place" and they "cannot effectively operate if [they] are neither fish nor
fowl."350

This section establishes that the State Bar and the Board's government
branch assignment has never been authoritatively decided.3 1 Though the
entities are often assumed or claimed to be either part of the executive35 2 or
judicial branch, 5 the various assumptions and claims conflict with one
another and lack substantial evidence to support them. 35 4

There are two reasons that support that this intra-governmental
boundary ambiguity exists. First, the sole power to assign an entity, like the
North Carolina State Bar or the Board of Law Examiners, to a particular
branch of government resides in one of three places: (1) the language of the
state constitution; (2) with the General Assembly; or (3) with the Supreme
Court of North Carolina. Second, any authoritarian entity that has
attempted to clarify the intra-governmental placement of either the State
Bar or the Board of Law Examiners holds no binding authority to place
either agency under a governmental branch.
i.

Power to Assign Government Branchfor Entities

The power to assign an entity like the State Bar or the Board of Law
Examiners to a government branch lies within the state constitution, the
General Assembly, or within the inherent powers of the state supreme
court.355

349. See supra Section III.B.
350. Memorandum from the N.C. State Bar (Aug. 30, 1976) (on file with the author, the North
Carolina State Archives, and available in the Appendix).
351. See infra Section m.B.I.i.
352. ANN L. SAWYER, INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF NORTH CAROLINA STATE ExEcUTIvE
DEPARTMENTS, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1982).

353. Brief for N.C. State Bar et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 341, at
13 n.5.

354. See infra notes 355-389 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Section m.B.1.i.
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The North Carolina Constitution, which would have absolute authority,
is silent on the issue of branch assignment for entities such as the State Bar
and the Board of Law Examiners.3 56 This silence separates the State Bar
and the Board of Law Examiners in North Carolina from those in
jurisdictions such as Ohio or Vermont, where the state constitution does
specifically assign a branch of government over the entities.357
Perhaps the North Carolina General Assembly came the closest to
designating the State Bar and the Board to a governmental branch when it
created the entities."' Within the State Bar and the Board's agency organic
statute is the following qualification: "Subject to the superior authority of
the General Assembly to legislate thereon by general law . . . the council is
hereby vested, as an agency of the state."35 9 And although the General
Assembly did not create the State Bar or the Board as an executive agency,
the omission by the General Assembly is commonplace, as it has not made
express governmental branch assignments for most of the State's
occupational licensing agencies.3 60 Rather, regulatory entities charged with
regulating a profession have been described as "unassigned." 36 ' These
independent entities are usually treated as being within the executive branch
of government.362 in establishing the various practice acts, the General
Assembly has used a variety of terminology,3 6 3 including agency, board,
and commission; 3 * however, none of these terms necessarily designate an
entity for a specific branch assignment.

356. See generally N.C. CONST.
357. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g); see also VT. CONST. ch. 11, § 30.
358. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 313 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24
(2015)).
359. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23; see also Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to
B.E. James, supra note 9.
360. The General Assembly has routinely created independent professional regulatory entities
and not included within a professional practice act an express assignment to a specific government
branch. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89(A) (2015) (creating the North Carolina Board of
Landscaping Architects, but not assigning the Board to a specific governmental branch).
361. See, e.g., SAWYER, supra note 352 (categorizing the N.C. State Bar and the Bd. of Law
Exam'rs as a single entity and labeled an unassigned licensing board (ULB)).
362. Id.
363. "Agency of the state" is used four times. Additionally, there are six occasions when the
General Assembly characterized an occupational licensing entity a part of a specific government
department or another agency. See infra note 364.
364. The practice acts referenced here are from the official version of the North Carolina
General Statutes, most recently published in 2015 by LexisNexis. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-453
to -459 (N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 74D-1 to -14 (Alarm Sys.
Licensing Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93E-1-1 to -1-14 (N.C. Appraisal Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
83A-1 to -17 (N.C. Bd. of Architecture); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-522 to -540 (N.C. Bd. of Athletic
Trainers); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 85B-1 to -9 (N.C. Auctioneers Comm'n); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
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Finally, the state supreme court could, through its inherent powers,
claim the State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners to be an official arm
of the judicial branch, as it did the Judicial Standards Commission in In re
Nowell.3 65 As Associate Attorney General Crump's letter notes, the
supreme court has never held the state bar to be an "arm of the court" or an

-

-

86A-1 to -27 (State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93-1 to -13 (State Bd. of
Certified Pub. Accountant Exam'rs); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-139 to -157.3 (State Bd. of
Chiropractic Exam'rs); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-151.8 to -151.21 (N.C. Code Officials
Qualification Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 88B-3 to -29 (N.C. Bd. of Cosmetic Art Exam'rs); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-22 to -48.3 (N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-350 to
370 (N.C. Bd. of Dietetics/Nutrition); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-39 to -51 (State Bd. of Exam'rs of
Elec. Contractors); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 88A-1 to -23 (N.C. Bd. of Electrolysis Exam'rs); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-500 to -511 (Bd. of Emp. Assistance Profls); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89C-1 to
24 (State Bd. of Exam'rs for Eng'rs & Surveyors); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90A-50 to -69 (State Bd.
of Envtl. Health Specialist Exam'rs); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89B-1 to -15 (State Bd. of Registration
for Foresters); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-210.18A to -210.29B (N.C. Bd. of Funeral Serv.); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 87-1 to -15.4 (State Licensing Bd. for Gen. Contractors); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89E1 to -24 (N.C. Bd. for Licensing of Geologists); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93D-1 to -16 (N.C. State
Hearing Aid Dealers & Fitters Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-151.43 to -151.64 (N.C. Home
Inspector Licensure Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90D-1 to -14 (N.C. Interpreter & Transliterator
Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89G-1 to -13 (N.C. Irrigation Contractors Licensing Bd.); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 89A-1 to -8 (N.C. Bd. of Landscape Architects); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89D-1 to -10 (N.C.
Landscape Contractors' Registration Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-24 to -26 (N.C. Bd. of Law
Exam'rs); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 74F-1 to -18 (N.C. Locksmith Licensing Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
143-143.8 to -143.54 (N.C. Mfr. Housing Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-270.45 to -270.63 (N.C.
Marriage & Family Therapy Licensing Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-620 to -636 (N.C. Bd. of
Massage & Bodywork Therapy); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-1 to -18.7 (N.C. Med. Bd.); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 90-178.1 to -178.7 (Joint Subcommittee of the N.C. Med. Bd. & N.C. Bd. of Nursing
regarding Midwifery Practice); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-171.19 to -171.49 (N.C. Bd. of Nursing);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §# 90-275.1 to -288.01 (State. Bd. of Exam'rs for Nursing Home Adm'r); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-270.65 to -270.81 (N.C. Bd. of Occupational Therapy); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90234 to -255.1 (N.C. State Bd. of Opticians); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-114 to -127.3 (N.C. State Bd.
of Exam'rs in Optometry); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-380 to -396 (N.C. State Bd. of Exam'rs of FeeBased Practicing Pastoral Counselors); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-85.2 to -85.44 (Bd. of Pharm.);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-270.24 to -270.39 (N.C. B& of Physical Therapy Exam'rs); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 87-16 to -27.1 (State Bd. of Exam'rs of Plumbing, Heating, & Fire Sprinkler
Contractors); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-202.2 to -202.14 (Bd. of Podiatry Exam'rs); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 74C-1 to -23 (Private Protective Serv. Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-329 to -345 (N.C.
Bd. of Licensed Prof'1 Counselors); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-270.1 to -270.22 (N.C. Psychology
Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 93A-1 to -13 (N.C. Real Estate Comm'n); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90C-20
to -37 (N.C. Recreational Therapy Licensing Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-52 to -64.1 (State Bd.
of Refrigeration Exam'rs); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-646 to -666 (N.C. Respiratory Care Bd.); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90B-1 to -16 (N.C. Social Work Certification & Licensure Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 89F-1 to -25 (N.C. Bd. for Licensing of Soil Scientists); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-292 to -307
(Bd. of Exam'rs for Speech & Language Pathologists & Audiologists); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 90-113.30 to -1 13.46A (N.C. Substance Abuse Prof'1 Practice Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90179 to -187.15 (N.C. Veterinary Med. Bd.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90A-70 to -81 (N.C. On-Site
Wastewater Contractors & Inspectors Certification Bd.).
365. See, e.g., 237 S.E.2d 246, 252 (N.C. 1977) (stating that the Judicial Standards
Commission was "created as an arm of the court").
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"agency of the court." 3 66 The court has also never "held the act integrating
the Bar an act necessarily only in the aid of the inherent powers of the
court."3 67 The court, while never designating a governmental branch, has
recognized two distinct methods of attorney discipline, one through the
statutory power granted to the State Bar, and another within the inherent
power of the court, and in this manner the court has separated itself rather
than integrated itself with the State Bar.3 68
ii.

Non-Binding Opinions

Where authorities have attempted to designate the State Bar and the
Board of Law Examiners within a governmental branch, the opinions have
been non-binding.3 69 This provides persuasive voice, but leaves the
ambiguity of governmental branch designation unsolved.
As stated above, Associate Attorney General Crump sent letters on

April 15, 1976, and May 3, 1976, which provided his legal interpretation,

.

and a basis for placing the State Bar and Board of Law Examiners in the
Executive Branch. 3 70 The letter laid out two reasons for this placement:
First, that the "agency" designation is evidence of an executive entity, but
noting that it is not definitive.3 7 ' Second, Attorney Crump reasoned that the
State Bar is a creature of the legislature, and that the Bar could not be
created without an act of the legislature. 372 "The letter also recognized that
the courts had given deference to the legislative power to regulate . .
law." 37 3 Thus, Attorney Crump's letter reasoned that the State Bar and

366. Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 9, at 2; see
also North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89, 92 (N.C. 1982) ("We agree with the
Court of Appeals ...
that the courts should not meddle in matters left to the State Bar by our
Legislature."); North Carolina State Bar v. Rogers, 596 S.E.2d 337, 341 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(referring to the State Bar as a state agency to which the Legislature has delegated the power to
regulate attorneys); Swenson v. Thibaut, 250 S.E.2d 279, 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) ("North
Carolina is different from many other jurisdictions in that there is a dual mechanism for the
regulation and discipline of attorneys practicing in the state courts ... [W]hile the interests of the
[State Bar and the courts] may, and often do, overlap, they are not always identical.").
367. See Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 9, at 2.
Swenson, 250 S.E.2d at 299.
368. See Letter dated Apr. 15, 1976, from David S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 9, at 2-3.
369. See, e.g., id. at 1.
370. Letter dated May 3, 1976, from David S. Crump to B.E. James, supra note 169.
371. Id. at 1.
372. Id. at 2.
373. Id. at 3; see also In re Ebbs, 63 S.E. 190, 195 (N.C. 1908) ("Even for so laudable an end
as purging the bar of unworthy members, we should not exercise doubtful power or unnecessarily
come into conflict with the Legislature.").
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Board of Law Examiners should be placed within the executive branch, and
subject to the APA.37 4
Attorney Crump's letter, however, is in direct conflict with Attorney
Kramer's letter placing the State Bar and Board within the judicial
branch."'
2.

Implications at Executive-Judicial Borders

Generally speaking, ambiguities of identity and status stemming from
an agency residing along various bureaucratic borders can have
considerable legal and practical implications.37 6 Legal issues pertaining to
constitutional law include the delegation doctrine3 77 and separation of
powers issues.378 Government branch ambiguity can also effect agency
Statutory
obligations and available defenses upon being sued. 7
implications can be significant, too. As O'Connell notes:
[T]here are no bright lines for boundary organizations. This ambiguity
derives from a dearth of decisions as well as inconsistency among the tests
used and decisions made. Administrative law scholars have said little
about this confusion. They seemingly have failed to note the circuit split
on how to analyze whether boundary organizations are subject to the
APA.3

80

The APA implication applies to state boundary bureaucracies as well.
As stated previously, North Carolina's APA applies to agencies within the
Furthermore, legislatively-created
executive branch of government.
independent occupational licensing agencies are uniformly considered
subject to the APA unless expressly exempt.' Thus, if the State Bar or the
Board is within the executive branch of government, then presumably, it is
subject to North Carolina's APA, as the General Assembly has never
specifically exempt the Bar or the Board. 3 82 Being subject to APA-like
procedures would not make much difference with respect to the State Bar's
374. Id. at 1-7.
375. See supra notes 160-183 and accompanying text.
376. See generally O'Connell, supra note 21, at 894-918.
377. See id. at 900-02.
378. See id. at 897-901.
379. See id. at 906-08.
380. Id. at 917.
381. See, e.g., N.C. Bd. of Pharm. v. Rules Review Comm., 620 S.E.2d 893, 895 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (evincing the Pharmacy Board's compliance with the State's APA by publishing a
notice of rulemaking proceedings in the North Carolina Register); Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C.
State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 571 S.E.2d 52, 55 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (evincing the same type of

APA publication compliance by the Dental Board).
382. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(c) (2015).
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current operations, but in significant ways, it could change how the Board
of Law Examiners develops and operates."' Indeed, engaging in noticeand-comment-type rulemaking procedures would allow for public
participation.3 84 Procedural process avenues for notice, petition, and
declaratory relief would allow stakeholders to seek clarity and suggest
amendments based on data and other evidence. 85
Without the clarity of a branch assignment, the extent to which an
agency promulgates its rules in conformity with APA-like standards of
notice-and-comment rulemaking can be left, as a matter, to self-regulation.
Self-regulation coupled with limited accountability oversight does not
necessarily result in an agency's ability to maintain its democratic
legitimacy. In fact, sometimes self-regulation is not "good regulation."386
With branch assignment unclear, judges, litigants, and others are left
guessing at the State Bar and the Board's legal status. 8
As a practical matter, the addition of rulemaking procedures for the
Board of Law Examiners may meet a legitimate need for increased
transparency, as the Board has historically received numerous complaints
about its procedures, many of which are addressed in the APA.388 These
complaints are not necessarily trivial; they originate from applicants
seeking state-issued licenses to engage in an occupation.38 9 Maintaining
ambiguity with respect to identity or status is better avoided. Our legal

383. See infra PartIV.
384. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-19.1 (requiring notice and comment rulemaking).
385. See id.
386. Contra Lunsford, supra note 13.
387. See, e.g., LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2014 WL
1213242, at *7-8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2014).
388. For example, from 1973 through 1975, an applicant to the Bar who was visually impaired
and did not receive testing accommodations for his disability was unsuccessful in passing the
North Carolina Bar Exam. Letter from Theodore R. Bryant, President, N.C. Council of the Blind,
to Fred P. Parker 111, Exec. Sec'y of the Bd. of Law Exam'rs (Nov. 1, 1975) (on file with author).
In November 1975, the applicant wrote to the Executive Director of the Board of Law Examiners,
"No exemptions or considerations were given in areas where it was impossible for a Blind
individual to give the correct answers," although such accommodations were given on the bar
exam in other jurisdictions, and on other exams in North Carolina. Id. In May 1976, the

governor's legal counsel acknowledged receipt of the applicant's correspondence and
recommended that the applicant seek relief directly from the Board of Law Examiners. Letter
from Samuel H. Long, Il, Legal Counsel. to the Governor of N.C., to Theodore R. Bryant,
President, N.C. Council of the Blind (May 13, 1976) (on file with author). But apparently that
avenue of relief had not worked. See Letter from Joe E. Covington, Dir. of Testing, Nat'l Conf. of
Bar Exam'rs, to Theodore R. Bryant, President, N.C. Council of the Blind (Oct. 1, 1975) (on file
with author).
389. See generally Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1127 (2014).
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system depends on certainty, not ambiguity. The normative value judgment
is that law should be certain, and of all people, lawyers should be following
the rules and providing for fair rulemaking procedures.
C The Public-PrivateBoundary
1.

A Public-Private Sector Ambiguity

The North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners also
operate along a boundary that delineates the public and private sectors.390
As stated in this Article's Introduction, many of North Carolina's
professional practice acts typify a regulatory model where autonomy and

self-regulation are predominant features.3 91 The need for expertise among
members of a regulatory body is a primary justification that supports using
such a model. 392 But this need for expertise can result in a regulatory body
composed of members, a majority of whom are active market
participants.3 93 For members with dual roles-regulatory and privatepotential and realized conflicts of interest must be managed.3 94
The governing body of the North Carolina State Bar and the Board of
Law Examiners comprises mostly licensed members of the legal
profession. 3 95 The 1933 session law that created and organized the State
Bar and the Board of Law Examiners acknowledged the councilors' status
as active market participants and specifically included a provision in the
session law to clarify that the members are not "public officers as that
phrase is used in the Constitution and laws of the State of North
Carolina." 396 Approximately forty-five years after creating the State Bar
and the Board, the General Assembly amended the Act to allow three public
members to serve on the State Bar's Council.3 97 As stated previously, when

390. See supra Section III.C.
391. Seesupra Part I.
392. Supreme Court Justice William Breyer captured the expertise justification with the
following statement: "I don't want a group of bureaucrats deciding ...
who can practice brain
surgery in this State... . I would like brain surgeons to decide that." Transcript of Oral Argument
at 31, N,C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2014) (No. 13-534), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argunent-transcripts/13-534_768c.pdf.
393. NC. Bd. ofDentalExam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1108-14.
394. See generally id. at 1101-23.
395. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17.
396. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 313 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24
(2015)).
397. See 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1162 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17
(2015)).

2016]

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY

683

first formed, the Council comprised a group of twenty.3 98 That number has
grown, and today, yields more than sixty members who are licensed
lawyers.3 99 Though public members still exist, their numbers remain at
three. 400

2.

Implications at Public-Private Borders

Legal implications associated with residing along the public-private
border demonstrate an inherent downside to self-regulation. The publicprivate boundary carries risks of increased exposure to litigation and its
defense, particularly regarding alleged violations of anti-competitive
statutes, including federal antitrust laws.
As demonstrated in North
CarolinaBoard of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission,40 1 the
availability of a state action immunity defense can hinge on factors found
exclusively at this public-private border.402 A brief summary of the case
follows.
The North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners was created for the
purpose of regulating and licensing dentists.403 The governing board
consists of eight individuals, six of whom "must be licensed, practicing
dentists." 4 0 The Board sent cease-and-desist letters to non-dentist teethwhitening service providers who operated out of shopping mall kiosks.4 0 5
In response to the Board's conduct, the Federal Trade Commission filed a
complaint alleging that the Board had violated anti-competitive and unfair
competition prohibitions under the Federal Trade Commission Act.406 The
Dental Board moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming immunity based on
its status as a state actor.407 This motion was denied by an administrative
law judge for want of active state supervision. 408 The case was then heard
on its merits, and the Board was found to be in violation of antitrust laws
based on its unreasonable restraint of trade regarding the teeth-whitening
398. 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 314.
399. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17; see also Councilors, N.C. BD. OF LAW ExAM'RS,
http://www.ncbar.gov/contacts/c-councilors.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
400. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17.
401. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (denying
antitrust immunity to members of the board who were also private actors for lack of state
supervision).
402. See id. at 1117.
403. Id. at 1104.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.

408. Id.
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kiosk cease-and-desist letters. 409 Both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court of the United States found that the active state supervision
requirement for an immunity defense was not met. 4 10 The Court noted that
the Board of Dental Examiners was not actively supervised by the state
when it interpreted teeth-whitening as a form of practicing dentistry and
when it sent cease-and-desist letters to teeth-whitening kiosk owners.41 1
In its opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that
antitrust immunity is granted out of respect for federalism. 412 The Court
further stated that when sovereign states delegate regulatory authority to
market participants, then the fact that those market participants are
regulating from within a state agency does not, in itself, cloak the market
participants with state action immunity. 413 The Court pointed out the
inherent dangers of allowing active market participants to regulate their
own profession, and it emphasized the need for accountability of such selfinterested regulators.4 14 In the case of the Dental Board, accountability
meant exposure to antitrust violations.415
The Court's discussion illustrates the implications of having a
professional regulatory board operate on the public-private boundary.
While the entity regularly acts from its position as a state agency, it has the
ability to act as a more private group of self-interested professionals.4 16
Thus, when a state bestows the title of "state agency" upon an entity, it has
the responsibility to actively supervise private market participants who are
naturally self-interested.4 17
IV. PROBLEMS REVEALED

The previous section mapped ambiguities associated with the North
Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law Examiners' existence along
various state-level boundaries. 4 18 These boundaries delineate (1) the public
sector from the private sector (public-private); (2) the tripartite branches of
government (intra-governmental); and (3) one government entity from

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1104-05.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
See supra Part III.
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another (inter-organizational). This section reveals three problems that
stem from those ambiguities: the lack of access to existing authority
regarding the State Bar and the Board's assigned government branch; 4 19 the
Board of Law Examiners' somewhat private mode of operation; 420 and the
Board's decades-long ability to finesse applicants' disclosure of expunged
criminal records.421
A. Lack of ControllingAuthority and Lack ofAccess to Non-Controlling
Authority
The first problem associated with the government branch assignment
ambiguity is that, in the face of differing opinions on the branch
assignment, people who are deciding how to handle inherent ambiguities or
conflicting claims do not have easy access to controlling authority to inform
their decisions.422 The lack of efficient access to information contributes to
confusion regarding the legal status of the North Carolina State Bar and the
Board of Law Examiners. 42 3 The document upon which the State Bar relies
to support its claim that it is an integral part of the judicial branch of state
government-the Attorney General's private letter from September 1,
1976-is all but inaccessible to the public, with very few people even
knowing of the letter's existence.424 A practical result of this confusion is
increased cost to litigants who must navigate the branch assignment
question without efficient access to controlling authority.425
As an example, I turn back to the 2014 LegalZoom case mentioned in
the Introduction of this Article.426 In a pretrial order and opinion for the
case, North Carolina's Business Court identified the North Carolina State
Bar as an agency within the executive branch of government. 4 2 7 The court's

419. See infra Section IV.A.
420. See infra Section IV.B.
421. See infra Section IV.C.
422. See Letter dated Sept. 1, 1976, from Howard A. Kramer to B.E. James, supra note 9.
423. See, e.g., LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2014 WL
1213242, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2014).
424. But see Lunsford, supra note 13.
425. See, e.g., LegalZoom, 2014 WL 1213242, at *8.
426. See supra Introduction.
427. Id. In its written order, the court accurately noted that North Carolina's Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) applies to "every agency except those specifically enumerated[,]" and that
"agency" under the APA "means an agency ... in the executive branch of the government of this
State." Id. at *8-9. Next, the court rightly observed that the General Assembly had not provided
the State Bar with an APA-exemption. See id. at *8. Thereafter, the court quoted the General
Assembly's 1933 enabling statute: "There is hereby created as an agency of the State of North
Carolina, ... the North Carolina State Bar." Id. While these premises are true, the court's claim
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characterization of the State Bar as an executive agency focused on the
agency's function rather than its form,428 as the characterization was made
in the context of determining whether the State Bar had rendered a final
decision, and if so, whether LegalZoom had exhausted its administrative
remedies.429 Concluding that jurisdiction was lacking, the court noted that
LegalZoom had not exhausted its administrative remedies.430 Presumably,
both the State Bar and LegalZoom were left to bear financial costs for legal
proceedings, some of which were futile. As the LegalZoom opinion
illustrates, as long as the State Bar's branch assignment is ambiguous, trial
courts risk issuing inconsistent decisions and decisions that are contrary to
the State Bar's point of view. I now turn to two perceived problems with
respect to the Board of Law Examiners.
B. The Board ofLaw Examiners'Somewhat PrivateMode of Operation
The Board of Law Examiners is faced with the weighty task of
regulating admission to the legal profession.43 1 The Board's work is
important in protecting the public4 32 and also involves handling a vast
Despite the
amount of private information regarding applicants. 433
important and sensitive nature of the Board's work, it is a public body434
and, like other public bodies, has obligations to comply with open
government laws, 435 regardless of whether it is subject to the APA or
judicial oversight.

that the State Bar is an agency within the executive branch of government does not necessarily
follow. For the claim to be valid, an additional unstated premise must be true-that an "agency of
the state" qualifies as an "agency within the executive branch of government." But the court
neither expressed this premise nor cited authority to support its truth. See id. at *8-9.
428. See also N.C. State Bar v. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89, 98 (N.C. 1982) (treating the State Bar
Disciplinary Hearing Commission's findings like any other administrative agency's findings and
reviewing those findings using the APA whole record standard).
429. See LegalZoom, 2014 WL 1213242, at *8.
430. Id. at *9.
431. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24.
432. See id.
433. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 142;

Characterand Fitness Guidelines, N.C. BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS, https://ncble.org/character-fitness/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2015); General Application Instructions, N.C. BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS,
https://ncble.org/application-information/general-applications/instructions/ (last visited Sept. 26,
2015). All three of these items support the existence of ample disclosure requirements.
434. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24.
435. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.9 to -318.18 (2015).
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Transparency and Open Government

A 2012 correspondence between the North Carolina Secretary of
State's office and the Board of Law Examiners reveals that the Secretary of
State's office contacted the Board about its failure to file a notice of
regularly scheduled meetings. 436 Such notices by occupational licensing
entities and other public bodies are posted on the Secretary of State's
website pursuant to North Carolina's open meetings law.437 These notices
of regularly scheduled meetings provide one way that members of the
public can find out when and where public bodies meet.438
In an initial e-mail, an official from the Secretary of State's office
contacted the North Carolina State Bar, seeking the Bar's assistance in
relaying the above-mentioned notice requirements to the appropriate
representative of the Board of Law Examiners, as the Secretary's office was
not able to find specific contact information on the Board's website. 43 9 in
the e-mail to the State Bar, the Secretary of State official noted that the
Board had not filed anything about regularly scheduled meetings as
required by all public bodies.4 0 The following day, a State Bar official
responded to the Secretary of State's office e-mail and copied the Executive
Director of the Board of Law Examiners, alerting the director "to the
possibility that the Board of Law Examiners may have a filing requirement
pursuant to North Carolina statute 143-318.12.'"
One day later, another public record reveals a communication from the
Board of Law Examiners to the Secretary of State's office." 2 That
communication confirms receipt of the filing requirement e-mail and states:
"haven't read the stat[ute]; don't set meetings that far in advance."44 3 It
also identifies the five times during the year in which the Board conducts its
meetings. 4

436. E-mail from Ann Wall, Gen. Counsel, N.C. Dep't of the Sec'y of State, to L. Thomas
Lunsford, II, Exec. Director, N.C. State Bar (Apr. 3, 2012, 2:16 PM) [hereinafter E-mail dated
Apr. 3, 2012, from Ann Wall to L. Thomas Lunsford, II] (on file with author).
§ 143-318.18; see N.C. DEP'T SEC'Y STATE,
437. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
http://www.secretary.state.nc.us (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
438. See, e.g., N.C. DEP'T SEC'Y STATE, supra note 437.
439. E-mail dated Apr. 3, 2012, from Ann Wall to L. Thomas Lunsford, II, supra note 436.
440. Id.
441. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.18.
442. E-mail dated Apr. 3, 2012, from Ann Wall to L. Thomas Lunsford, II, supra note 436.
443. Id.
444. See Letter dated Apr. 17, 2012, from Fred P. Parker III to Elaine Marshall, supra
note 339.
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Two weeks later, the Board sent a letter further following up on the
Secretary's office filing requirement reminder." 5 The Board's letter states,
"the Board holds its regular meetings each year in January, June, and
October. Additionally, a business meeting is conducted during each bar
examination grading session, in March and August of each year."" 6 The
letter goes on to specifically include the dates and locations of the
remaining regularly scheduled meetings for 2012.44 Thereafter, the letter
makes two claims."
First, the Board claims to be exempt from North Carolina's open
meetings since "[d]uring its meetings, the Board discusses issues involved
with preparing, approving, administering and/or grading examinations and
issues dealing with confidential information relating to individual
applicants."" The Board's claimed exemption does not appear to be
supported by the plain language of the statute that qualifies the scope of
North Carolina's open meetings law.450 According to the language of the
statute, public bodies who are authorized to prepare, approve, administer,
and grade occupational licensing exams and investigate, examine, and
determine the character and fitness qualifications of individual applicants
are exempt from the open meetings law while performing those functions.451
The Board claims that because "during" its meetings it conducts business
that is exempt from the open meetings law that all of its operations are
exempt.452
Second, the Board states that "during" its meetings it discusses
confidential information that is not subject to the Public Records Act.453
"[T]o prevent the disclosure of such information, the [Board's] meetings are
closed pursuant to 143-318.11 [(a)](1)."4 5 4 That statute allows public bodies
to hold closed sessions "only upon a motion duly made and adopted at an

445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Arguably, the Board's annual "off-site" location for its August meeting violates North
Carolina's open meetings laws, as any meeting that is subject to the open meetings law needs to
occur within the state of North Carolina. Portions of the cost are available in the Board's financial
audit statements. The 2012 letter was the only notice of a regularly scheduled meeting on file
based on a public records request spanning ten years.
448. Letter dated Apr. 17, 2012, from Fred P. Parker III to Elaine Marshall, supra note 339.
449. Id.
450. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.18.
451. See id.
452. Letter dated Apr. 17, 2012, from Fred P. Parker III to Elaine Marshall, supra note 339
(stating the Board of Law Examiners was exempt from open meeting laws).
453. Id.
454. Id.
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open meeting."45 5 The Board's assertion that it uses the closed session
provisions of the open meetings law suggests by its own admission that it is
a public body that is subject to the open meetings law.456 While it may be
true that much of what the Board does is confidential in nature, not all of its
operations can reasonably be regarded as private. 457
2.

Fairness and Procedural Process

The Board's 2012 claimed exemption and historic non-compliance
with North Carolina's Open Meetings Laws has compromised the Board's
transparency and perceived fairness as a government entity.4 58 Perhaps in
response to the December 2014 Legislative report concluding that
occupational licensing agencies need more oversight or the February 2015
decision in the Dental Board case, the State Bar has been noticeably more
transparent in 2014, 2015, and 2016. Even still, the Board presumably
makes decisions that would benefit from notice-and-comment-type
rulemaking, such as decisions regarding conditional admission, admission
by comity, or whether the Board should re-delegate its exclusive authority

455. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.18 (emphasis added). If that motion is based on (a)(1),
then the motion must state the name or citation of the law that renders the information
confidential.
456. See Letter dated Apr. 17, 2012, from Fred P. Parker III to Elaine Marshall, supra
note 339; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.9 to -318.18.
457. See, e.g., Meeting Agenda of the N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs (June 10-12, 2015) (copy of
agenda on file with author) (including agenda items such as finance and audit reports, admission
by comity reports, and action to determine passing score on July 2015 administration of bar
examination).
458. For example, in April 2015, the board made numerous amendments to its rules,
regulations, and code of conduct for bar examinees. See Proposed Amendments to Rules
Governing the Admission to Practice Law in the State of N.C. (on file with author); see also Bar
Examination Code of Conduct, N.C. BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS, http://ncble.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/codeofconduct.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Bd. of Law Exam'rs of the
State of N.C. Policy Manual (last updated June 2015) (red-lined version on file with author).
Some of these changes were effective immediately. For example, the Code of Conduct for
Applicants was revised to prohibit examinees from wearing hats or scarves during the examination
absent prior written approval from the board. See Bar Examination Code of Conduct, supra
(Regulation 6). Notwithstanding the new regulation prohibiting scarves, an existing regulation
remained in the code which permits examinees to "wear a lightweight outer garment, WITH NO
POCKETS OF ANY KIND, into the examination room." See id. Neither the regulation
prohibiting scarves nor the regulation permitting light-weight outer garments with no pockets
cross-referenced each other. See id. Like previous changes to the Board's rules, regulations, and
application questions, these changes were not publicized in substantial compliance with APA-like
requirements, such as posting red-lined versions of changes and notifying other interested parties,
such as law school deans, staff, and faculty.
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to set standards for bar admission to the "separate but related" State Bar.459
Thus, in 1971, the task of deciding which law schools' graduates would be
permitted to sit for the exam was delegated by the Board to the State Bar.4 60
Prior to this time, the Board made approval of law school decisions."'
Even assuming that the Board did not make policy-type decisions that
would benefit from notice-and-comment-type rulemaking, the need for
other types of procedural process mechanisms remain. To illustrate, the
Board's current rules lack an obvious declaratory relief avenue to engage
the Board for written and publicly available clarification.4 62 Moreover,
efficient and timely access to information that often can clarify matters is
still limited.463 For example, access to a copy of the current application is
notably inefficient. 46

459. See, e.g., N.C. Bd. Law Exam'rs, Meeting Agenda of the North Carolina Board of Law
Examiners (June 10-12, 2015) (on file with author) (meeting agenda and author's notes
concerning the Board's status of not granting admission by comity with twenty-one states and
action to recommend granting admission by comity with seven of those twenty-one states).
460. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, published in 275 N.C.

692 app. 697 (1970) (Rule IX) ("Every general applicant .... commencing with the examination
in August 1971, shall file with the Secretary a certificate from. . . [a] Law School approved by the
Council of The North Carolina State Bar, a list of which is available in the office of the
Secretary."). Relevant here is the fact that the Secretary of the North Carolina State Bar was, at
this time, also the Secretary of the Board of Law Examiners, as the single-secretary provision
would be in effect until 1973. See 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws at 6 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 84-24 (2015)).
461 See RULEs GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, published in 208 N.C.

857 app. 861 (1935) (Rule 12) (emphasis added).
12. Approved Law Schools.
The law schools maintained by the University of North Carolina, Duke University, and Wake
Forest College are hereby approved; other law schools will be approved if and when they
satisfy the Board that their standards, work, and equipment are substantially the equivalent of
those of one or the other of the above-mentioned law schools. The Board may, from time to
time, withdraw approval from law schools previously approved, if and when it determines
that they do not conform to the foregoing requirements.
462. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Sept. 24, 2015),

http://ncble.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/rules.pdf.
463. See examples cited infra notes 464-466.
464. Visitors who search the Board's website for information about the bar exam are directed
to the website for the National Conference of Bar Examiners, where it is necessary to establish a
username and password to access the Board's current application. Thus, visitors must act
consistent with the intention to sit for the North Carolina Bar Examination in order to access the
contents of the application. The inability to readily access the Board's current admission
application effectively prevents various stakeholders from gaining access to relevant and needed
information. Notifications on the National Conference of Bar Examiners' website, which visitors
who wish to establish a username and password must acknowledge, anecdotally, have effectively
deterred law students and others from accessing the current application for fear of consequences
associated with seeking access to the application absent a subjective intent to sit for the
examination in the near future.
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People would benefit from timely and efficient access to the
application and the important information that it contains that is not found
elsewhere. 4 65 For example, a hypothetical judge presiding over a session of
court in Kentucky, who before entering an order of expunction for someone
who had expressed an intention to seek a North Carolina law license, would
be able to efficiently discern whether applicants seeking admission to North
Carolina's bar were required to disclose such records. Pre-law advisors;
law school administrators, faculty, and staff; mental health professionals,
and even lawyer assistance program personnel would be better equipped to
accurately answer questions received, with regularity, from potential
applicants seeking admission to the bar.466
C. A PerceivedFinesse ofExpunged CriminalRecord History Disclosures
A more troubling concern, however, is my belief that the Board of Law
Examiners has finessed 4 67 applicant disclosures of certain information,
including expunged criminal record histories, for decades, by failing to
clarify, in writing, the scope of applicant disclosure requirements prior to
July 2013.468

465. See, e.g., N.C. STATE BD. OF LAW ExAM'RS, APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE

NORTH CAROLINA BAR EXAMINATION (2013) (sample questions from N.C. Bar Exam
Application) (on file with author).
466. As a hypothetical example of a consequence of this set-up, consider an out-of-state law
professor who has a student in her Professional Responsibility course who cannot ascertain, in
writing, what North Carolina's passing score is for the MPRE. The only place where this
information (a score of 80) is found in writing is on the first page of North Carolina's Character
and Fitness Application, which is only accessible after creating the aforementioned passwordprotected account with the National Conference of Bar Examiners. Such an account creates a
"unique identifier" for each account holder, and "state bar admission offices may use the NCBE
Number as an identifier for other admission-related purposes." Presumably, then, the Board could
discover when an individual created an account, when the individual accessed applications from
particular jurisdictions, and so on.
467. As a card playing technique, "finesse" is an action applied to the card game known as
Contract Bridge. The technique involves chance, working only fifty percent of the time, but
enables card players to win additional tricks should there be favorable positioning of one or more
cards in the hands of opponents. Finesses win tricks by using lower-valued cards than normally
would be required, saving higher-valued cards for later play as needed. Significantly, a successful
finesse requires opponents to question normal rules of Bridge play; thus, turning what was clear
into the obscure. Bridge players who finesse use the technique as a last resort, as overusing the
tactic does not prove successful.
468. North Carolina is one of only four states to explicitly instruct applicants with expunged
criminal record histories that they need not disclose such histories for bar admission purposes.
This was the case in North Carolina as of 2014. The other three states are New Hampshire,
Virginia, and Texas. Presumably, Texas's exemption is based on a provision in its state
constitution that empowers the judicial branch to promulgate rules that are "not inconsistent with
the laws of the state." See TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 31 ("[Texas] Supreme Court is responsible for

692

SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Prior to July 2013, the Board's written rules, guidelines, and
application questions did not specify whether the Board's disclosure
requirements mandated applicants reveal criminal record histories that had
been judicially expunged. 4 6 9 This omission left applicants guessing, which
was problematic because applicants seeking admission were, and are,
required to be completely forthright in their responses to the Board's
questions about prior conduct. 470 Two of the Board's bar admission
application questions read:
19. Have you EVER IN YOUR LIFE been arrested, given a written
warning, or taken into custody, or accused, formally or informally, of the
violation of an offense other than traffic violations?471
24. FULL DISCLOSURE: Is there any other incident or occurrence in
your life which is not otherwise referred to in this application which you
would like to acknowledge in the interest of full disclosure? It is crucial
that you honestly and fully answer all questions, regardless of whether you
believe the information is relevant. 47 2 [Sic]

In addition to this application question, the Board's rules explicitly
state that applicants who fail to fully disclose "any and all facts relating to
any civil or criminal proceedings" will not "be licensed to practice law . .
or permitted to sit for the bar examination." 47 3

the efficient administration of the judicial branch and shall promulgate rules of administration not
inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform
administration of justice in the various courts.") (emphasis added).
469. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, publishedin appendix of
various pre-2013 N.C. Reports; see also numerous pre-2013 versions of the Board's Rules,
Guidelines, Applications, FAQs, & Codes of Conduct printed from the Board's website (on file
with author).
470. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 142;
Characterand Fitness Guidelines, N.C. BD. OF LAW EXAM'RS, https://ncble.org/character-fitness/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2015):
No one shall be licensed to practice law in this state by examination or comity ... who fails
to disclose fully to the board, whether requested to do so or not, the facts relating to any
disciplinary proceedings or charges as to his professional conduct, whether same have been
terminated or not, in this or any other state, or any federal court or other jurisdiction, or ...
who fails to disclose fully to the board, whether requested to do so or not, any and all facts
relating to any civil or criminal proceedings, charges or investigations involving the
applicant, whether the same have been terminated or not in this or any other state or in any of
the federal courts or other jurisdictions.

Id.
471. N.C. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, Application for Admission to the North Carolina Bar
Examination (2013) ("Question 19(a)").
472. See id. ("Question 24" of Aug. 2014 version) (this catch-all question is still included in
the bar application questions).
473. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 142;
Characterand Fitness Guidelines, N.C. BD. OF LAW ExAM'RS, https://ncble.org/character-fitness/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
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The Board's failure, in the wording of these application questions, to
explicitly state the limits of its authority under state law to ask applicants
about their expunged criminal record histories placed applicants in an
awkward and risky position, in that unnecessarily reporting an offense
could lead to character and fitness questions, while mistakenly failing to
disclose prior history could be grounds for denial of the applicant's
license.474 Over decades, applicants disclosed criminal record histories that
had been expunged, not because the applicants had planned to do so or no
longer wanted to use the statutory non-disclosure benefit that had been
conferred by the General Assembly, but rather because applicants feared an
accusation of not being fully candid.4 7 5
The Board benefitted from its failure to expressly address disclosure
requirements for applicants with expunged criminal record histories. By
comparison, most other jurisdictions' bar admission authorities regularly
include express instructions to applicants about the extent to which
disclosure requirements apply to expunged records. Indeed, the National
Conference of Bar Examiners' sample character and fitness questionnaire
explicitly instructs applicants that they must disclose criminal record
histories that have been expunged.476 Following the national conference's
lead, at least thirty-five states expressly instruct applicants that expunged
criminal record histories must be disclosed.4 77
In 2013, the Board's ability to finesse applicants' information on
expunged criminal record histories ended.4 78 In May of that year, the North
Carolina General Assembly enacted legislation to clarify the extent and
value of North Carolina's expunction remedy. 479 The legislation applies to
government agencies and expressly requires agencies who ask about
criminal record histories to first advise that state law allows applicants with
expunged criminal records to exercise their statutorily conferred

474. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a Professional Credential, 94
YALE L.J. 491 (1985); Keith Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession's Good Moral
CharacterRequirement, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1037 (2008).
475. E.g., Interview with Scott Harkey, July 2012 Applicant for Admission to the N.C. State
Bar (Dec. 2011) (notes on file with author).
476.

See NAT'L CONFERENCE BAR EXAM'RS, REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF A CHARACTER

REPORT 19 (2015), availableat www.ncbe.com (sample character and fitness application).
477. An Act to Prohibit Expunction Inquiry, ch. 53, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, 137-38
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-153 (2015)).
478. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 136-37.
479. Id.
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nondisclosure benefit. 48 0 Part of the legislation involved codifying case law
that had been part of North Carolina's jurisprudence for years.481
Soon after the clarifying legislation was passed, the existing Chair of
the Board of Law Examiners sent a letter to the then current president of the
North Carolina State Bar and the North Carolina Bar Association. In the
letter, the Board's Chair requested assistance from the regulatory agency
and the trade association in petitioning the General Assembly during its
next session for a statutory exemption from the new legislation.4 82 In
support of its request, the Chair stated that the new legislation "effectively
negate[d]" the Board of Law Examiners' disclosure requirements. 483 This
claim confirms that up until the 2013 clarifying legislation the Board had
been "effectively requiring" applicants to disclose expunged criminal
records and wished to continue to do so. 484 Although an instruction to
applicants about disclosing expunged criminal record histories appears on
the Board's application, it is notably inefficient to access the application.
Additionally, the Board made significant amendments to its rules in June
2015. Despite an opportunity to incorporate rulemaking procedures or add
clarifying provisions regarding disclosure requirements vis-A-vis expunged
records, the Board chose not to address these issues.485
V. SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION
The problems and ambiguities described in this Article are multilayered and complex. They did not emerge overnight, and they do not lend
themselves to simple or intuitive solutions. Thus, the ambiguities of
identity and status mapped here-inter-organizational, intra-governmental,
and public-private-though seemingly subtle on the surface cause harm and
should not be maintained.
A. Resolving Ambiguities
To the extent that the North Carolina State Bar continues to claim a
judicial status, authority in support of that claim needs to be more
accessible. Limited access to the letter, and the story behind it, is evidence

480. Id
481. See State v. Swann, 676 S.E.2d 654, 657 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
482. See Letter from James R. Van Camp, Chairman, N.C. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, to M. Keith
Kapp, R. Michael Wells, Sr., Alan W. Duncan (June 26, 2013).
483. See id.
484. See id.
485. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 142.
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that these ambiguities of identity and status persist. Having access to
authority in support of this claim will reduce confusion. 4 8
Yet, still lingering is the question of whether the September 1, 1976,
privately issued letter from Deputy Attorney General Kramer can, or
should, be used to resolve a government branch assignment question. The
body of the letter contains a single sentence. 487 The substance of that
sentence is a claim that the North Carolina State Bar is part of the judicial
branch and, therefore, exempt from the strictures of the APA.48 8 Nothing in
the letter, either in text or citation, supports Attorney Kramer's claim.4 89
The July 1977 letter from the Attorney General to the Board of Law
Examiners is silent with respect to a government branch claim. 4 90 The letter
establishes that the Attorney General "concurred" in the Board's recent
decision to withdraw its APA-compliant rules. 491 Thus, the Board's APA
exemption is one that was self-served. As shown below, with agency drift
and inadequate oversight, not many would come to know this.
The State Bar holds a supervisory role vis-A-vis the Board of Law
Examiners, and the State Bar's claim to be judicial has implications for the
Board. To the extent that the entities are "related" on an interorganizational or government branch axis, obligations and precedent
applied to one entity may, as a matter of automaticity, be applied to the
other entity. But these entities do not follow the same procedural process
rules. Thus, cases condoning one entity's procedures may not be applicable
to the other entity's operations. It is here that the additional ambiguities
stemming from inter-organizational
boundaries can complicate
implications. For example, while the State Bar, since at least 2007, has
acted in conformity with APA-type procedures and complies with open
meetings laws, the same cannot be said for the Board of Law Examiners.492
In my view, the entity that is the best situated to resolve the interorganizational boundary ambiguity, specifically the extent to which the
relationship between the State Bar and the Board is both lateral and
hierarchical, is the General Assembly. The State Bar and the Board are

486. One goal in writing this Article is to make the Office of the Attorney General 1976
letters, including the September 1, 1976, branch assignment letter, searchable on mainstream
electronic legal databases.
487. Letter dated Sept. 1, 1976, from Howard A. Kramer to B.E. James, supra note 9.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Letter dated July 27, 1977, from Rufus L. Edmisten to Fred P. Parker 1H, supra note 147.
491. Id.
492. See supra notes 434-466 and accompanying text.
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creatures of the legislature. 4 93 It was the General Assembly that originally
structured the entities this way-one as an agency with supervisory powers
and the other as a subservient board, but also delegating independent
rulemaking authority to both the agency and the board. Likewise, it was the
General Assembly's 1973 law that repealed the single-secretary provision
from 1933 and in 2004 did provide a separate secretary for both the State
Bar and the Board.494
Clarifying legislation could address interorganizational ambiguities, spelling out the statutory obligations for the
State Bar and the Board, particularly with respect to oversight-related
obligations.
As with the resolution of inter-organizational ambiguity, the resolution
of intra-governmental ambiguity best lies in the body that first established
the entities, the General Assembly. As O'Connell notes, "labels have
consequences, and the authority to label can be significant."49 5 I suggest the
General Assembly contribute to the resolution of the State Bar and the
Board's intergovernmental ambiguity by focusing on the entities' function
rather than their form. While both entities perform adjudicatory, and thus
judicial function, the State Bar and the Board also set standards that are
policy making in nature. 496 This shift in attention to the entities' function
could be accomplished by having a test, besides branch assignment, to
determine whether an entity is subject to the APA.497
Although I argue that the General Assembly is the entity best situated
to resolve the intra-governmental ambiguity, the counter-argument might be
made that the supreme court is equally well positioned to address the
branch assignment question. Indeed, if the court were to pre-emptively
affirm the claim that the State Bar and the Board are part of the judicial
branch of government, questions regarding legislative acquiescence or

493. See 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 313 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24
(2015)).
494. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (1965), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-24 (1975). See
also 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws at 319.
495. See generally O'Connell, supra note 21, at 894.
496. For example, the North Carolina State Bar enacts rules concerning the educational
minimal qualifications for applicants seeking admission to the bar and the North Carolina Board
of Law Examiners enacts rules pertaining to admission by comity. See 27 N.C. ADMIN. CODE
.0500 (2015).
497. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4001 (2015) (defining "agency" as "any ...
unit of the
state government empowered by the basic laws to make regulations or decide cases"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(2) (2015) (defining "'agency' [as] any other unit of state government
authorized or required by any statute or constitutional provision to make rules or to determine

contested cases").

2016]

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY

697

agency interpretation deference might be avoided.4 98 Though the court may
hypothetically be able to resolve the branch assignment ambiguity,
practically speaking, such an action would not resolve the Bar and the
Board's inter-organizational ambiguity.
The resolution that I propose to the public-private ambiguity of the
Board of Law Examiners is somewhat different from the legislative
resolution that I suggest for the other two forms of boundary bureaucracy.
Specifically, I propose that the public-private ambiguity be addressed by the
State Bar and Board themselves. The State Bar should continue its course,
operating in ways that promote transparency and fairness.499 The State Bar
and the Board can watch actions that other professional regulators take.s0

498. In Duggins v. North CarolinaState Board of CertifiedPublicAccountant Examiners, the
court held that "our courts often have held that '[a]n administrative interpretation of a statute,
acquiesced in over a long period of time, is properly considered in the construction of the statute
by the courts."' 212 S.E.2d 657, 662 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (emphasis added) (quoting 7 STRONG,
N.C. INDEX 2D, STATUTES, § 5, 75), cert. granted, 214 S.E.2d 430 (N.C. 1975), af'd, 240 S.E.2d
406 (N.C. 1978). But the acquiescence in Duggins concerned a somewhat more mundane agency
interpretation issue, as the question related to an experience pre-requisite, not a tripartite branch
assignment. See id. at 662. The Duggins court further indicated that its decision hinged upon the
fact that the Board's interpretation of the statute was consistent with legislative intent. Id.; accord
Duke Power Co. v. Clayton, 164 S.E.2d 289, 294 (N.C. 1968) (citing In re Vanderbilt University,
114 S.E.2d 655, 658 (N.C. 1960) (stating the court "will not follow an administrative
interpretation which, in its opinion, is in conflict with the clear intent and purpose of the statute
under consideration")). Thus, while the State Bar appears to have operated under the branch
assignment claimed in the Office of the Attorney General's September 1976 letter, it is quite
possibly in conflict with the clear intent and purpose of the original enabling statute. See 1933
N.C. Sess. Laws at 319 (defining the State Bar Council's powers as an agency of the state that is
"[s]ubject to the superior authority of the General Assembly .... ).
499. The North Carolina Medical Board is currently in the process of implementing lifetime
limits for board members in order to better share diversity of governance in the self-regulating
context.
500. For example, in December 2014, the North Carolina Medical Board presented a report to
the Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee of the North Carolina General Assembly.
Counsel for the Medical Board forecasted proposed rule changes for the Medical Board that
included lifetime limits for Medical Board members. Medical Board Handouts, APO Meeting
(Dec. 17, 2014) (on file with author). Such limits would allow for an increase in the proportion of
physicians who during their career would serve as members of the Board. Id. Lawyer-members
of the North Carolina State Bar Council serve three-year terms, are eligible to serve three
consecutive three-year terms, and may then serve again in that same way upon not serving for one
three year period. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-18 (2015). Like members of the State Bar Council,
members of the North Carolina Board of Law Examiners serve three-year terms, but up until
October 2015, Board member terms were consecutively renewable without limit. At the time of
this Article's printing, pending before the Supreme Court of North Carolina is a proposed
amendment to North Carolina State Bar Rules that would cap Board of Law Examiner member
service to four consecutive three-year terms. See ProposedRule Amendments, N.C. STATE BAR,
http://www.ncbar.com/rules/proprul.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
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B. The Need for Oversight
The fundamental problem that is caused by the State Bar and the
Board's branch assignment ambiguity is inadequate oversight. This lack of
oversight is manifested in several ways. First, the statutorily created
oversight that requires the chief justice to certify the Board's rules is too
limited in its scope to be a useful check on the Board's rulemaking
power."0 ' To illustrate, to certify the Board's rules as being consistent with
the provisions found within the Board's enabling statutes does not require
the court to find the rules consistent with other duly enacted law.
Additionally, prior to the 1970s, the supreme court certified that the rules
complied not only with the State Bar and Board statutes as currently
codified, but also were consistent with the expressed intent of the original
organizing Act of 1933.502
To address the inadequate oversight problem, the General Assembly
needs to ensure that its statutory language that provides for supreme court
oversight is proper in scope. Moreover, for agencies like the State Bar and
the Board of Law Examiners, questions regarding what type and extent of
oversight is deemed adequate warrant periodic review, as adequate
oversight of independent and self-regulatory entities is valuable to the
organization and those within or outside its walls. 503
The General Assembly itself is currently studying whether more
oversight is needed and, assuming it decides to take action, is poised to
have a plan implemented as early as 2016. In 2013, the North Carolina
General Assembly charged its non-partisan Program Evaluation Division
with evaluating the structure, organization, and operation of occupational
licensing agencies within the state.s" The Division's report, which
identified fifty-fives5 o occupational licensing agencies in North Carolina,
was delivered to the General Assembly in December 2014 and again in
March 2015.506 Based on its findings, the Program Evaluation Division
501. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
502.

§§

84-15 to -24.

See, e.g., RULES OF BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS: STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra

note 263.
503. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108, 1117 (2015)
(denying antitrust immunity for lack of adequate state supervision to members of North Carolina's
Board of Dental Examiners where a majority of seats on the eleven member board were
designated to be filled by member-elected licensed dentists who were also private market
participants in dentistry).
504. An Act Entitled, "Regulatory Reform Act of 2013," ch. 413, sec. 10(a), 2013 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1759.
505. There may be slightly more than fifty-five. See supra note 364.
506. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AGENCIES SHOULD NOT BE CENTRALIZED, BUT STRONGER
OVERSIGHT is NEEDED, supra note 22, at 16.
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found that stronger oversight was needed for occupational licensing
agencies and recommended the establishment of an occupational licensing
commission."0 7 Notably, the North Carolina State Bar and the Board of
Law Examiners was jointly considered one of the fifty-five occupational
licensing entities.os identified by the Division's study.
As occupations appear, evolve, and disappear, licensing regimes cycle
through periods of regulation and deregulation.o Despite this flux, one
aspect of occupational licensing regulation that has been long-lasting is the
uniform procedures provided by APA-like statutory schemes. In my view,
the Board of Law Examiners, like other North Carolina occupational
licensing boards, should be subject to the state's APA. Even if the Board of
Law Examiners is not required to act in a manner that is consistent with
notice-and-comment-type rulemaking procedures, there are valid reasons
why the Board should voluntarily comply with such procedures. Assuming
the Board of Law Examiners is within the judicial branch of government, its
operations should still be subject to notice-and-comment-type rulemaking
procedures and its meetings should be open. Models in other states show
that Boards of Bar Examiners can operate successfully, and perhaps better,
with public participation.
Having established that the current oversight of the North Carolina
Board of Law Examiners is insufficient, it is worth pointing out why
sufficient oversight is useful. At least four reasons present themselves.
First, sufficient oversight helps to maintain the democratic legitimacy of
administrative agencies;5 10 second, it preserves, rather than threatens, the
ability to self-govern;s1 ' and third, sufficient oversight ensures fairness and
fosters public participation that can, through a sort of crowd-sourcing way,
result in superior outcomes. Finally, sufficient oversight is particularly
necessary for occupational licensing because despite the fact that licensing
is established to test on competencies, history demonstrates that people

507. Id. at 1. The report found that moving to a centralized authority would not be efficient
and could come at a significant cost, but that the current oversight of occupational licensing
agencies was lacking, especially with regard to compliance with reporting requirements. Id.
508. The position of the North Carolina State Bar is that it is not an occupational licensing
entity. See Lunsford, supra note 13, at 6-7; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B (2015).
509. See, e.g., The De-licensing of Occupations in the United States, MONTHLY LABOR REV.,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (May 2015),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/the-de-licensing-of-occupations-in-the-unitedstates.htm (identifying watchmakers as one of several de-regulated professional occupations
within select states since 1975).
510. See infra text accompanying notes 513-514.
511. See infra text accompanying notes 516-18.
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have been excluded from professions for a variety of reasons unrelated to
competency.5 12
First, adequate oversight for government entities helps to maintain the
democratic legitimacy of the entity, ensuring the "sunshine" of an open
government.5 1 According to scholar David Arkush, of the three available
methods for achieving democratic legitimacy for administrative agencies,
the most promising one is "the democracy ideal," which rests upon
"enhanced citizen participation" in an agency's rulemaking process.514
Second, sufficient oversight for government entities can help preserve a
profession's ability to self-regulate, rather than threaten it. Today, agency
action taken in a manner inconsistent with notice-and-comment-type
rulemaking procedures stands out, and not in a positive way.5 1I Thus, the
Board of Law Examiners has appeared as noticeably out-of-step with other
occupational licensing agencies, including vis-A-vis agencies that issue
licenses for more traditional professions. 516 Current technology allows
government actors to share information with the public quickly and easily.
If anything, public expectations for transparency in government have
increased.5 " The Government agencies tasked with regulating state
professions share considerably more information with members of the
public as compared to fifty years ago.
Third, when oversight is sufficient, fairness and public participation is
fostered. This is why compliance with open government laws and APAlike procedural processes matter.
Finally, sufficient oversight is necessary for occupational licensing
entities. Transparent rulemaking procedures that create avenues for public

512. See e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 38 (1961) (holding it unconstitutional to
deny an applicant membership to the California State Bar based upon his political views).
513. David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
611, 620 (2012).
514. Id. at 612, 620.
515. E.g., Daniel Hubbard, Grassroots Group Wants Planning Board Decision Reversed:
Report, PATCH (Aug. 18, 2015), http://patch.com/new-jersey/ridgewood/grassroots-group-wantsplanning-board-decision-reversed-report.
516. Compare N.C. STATE Gov'T WEB SITE ARCHIVES & ACCESS PROGRAM, Board
(http://wayback.archive-it.org/org-67/20091121011108/http://www.ncmedboard.org/
Meetings
boardmeetings/), with N.C. STATE GOV'T WEB SITE ARCHIVES & ACCESS PROGRAM, July 2009
Important Information for When Results are Released
Bar Exam Applicants(http://wayback.archive-it.org/org-67/20091121010658/http://www.ncble.org/) (last updated Sept.
29, 2009).
517. See generally Edward Wyatt and Claire Cain Miller, Tech Giants Issue CallforLimits on
Government
Surveillance
of
Users,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
9,
2013),

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/technology/tech-giants-issue-call-for-limits-on-govermentsurveillance-of-users.htmlpagewanted=all&_r0).
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participation and engagement help preserve the perceived legitimacy of the
law licensing process because standards can be different for applicants
seeking a law license as compared to those who have already obtained a law
license.' Conduct that would not constitute professional misconduct or
facts that could not justify lawyer discipline could easily be relevant to the
moral character and professional fitness inquiry for bar admission
authorities.
Occupational licensing provides significant benefits, but it comes with
costs as well. Costs are passed along to end users in the form of higher
rates for professionals' services, and to applicants in the form of tuition and
fees, which can even prohibit entry into the profession.519 In addition,
occupational licensing can reduce mobility, as workers can be deterred from
moving to new jurisdictions where they are unlicensed.520 Courts have
recognized that the costs of occupational licensing regulation do not always
outweigh the benefits.521 One cost associated with occupational licensing
that we can avoid, however, is the cost of compromised democratic
legitimacy for state entities charged with regulating the professions within
their borders. When those models of regulatory boards are characterized by
autonomy and self-regulation, risks associated with residing along
bureaucratic boundaries are likely to arise. To the extent that regulatory
entities involved with self-regulation of the legal profession reside along
various bureaucratic boundaries, conditions are ripe for developing
ambiguities of identity and status regulatory entities. As stated above, of
the three available methods for achieving administrative agency democratic
legitimacy, the most promising one is "the democracy ideal," resting upon

518. Compare Murphy v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 431 S.W.3d 428, 429 (Ky. 2014) (holding that an
attorney with three DUI convictions could be publicly reprimanded), with Frasher v. W. Va. Bd.
of Law Exam'rs, 408 S.E.2d 675, 680 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that there are substantive
differences between those who are already lawyers and those who are applying to be lawyers).
519. See, e.g., Kathryn Watson, OccupationalLicensing Doesn't Really Benefit Consumers,
Study Finds, LAWATCHDOG.ORG, http://watchdog.org/201019/occupational-licensing-licensureconsumers/ (Feb. 19, 2015) (citing a study from George Mason University showing that "opticians
. . . in [] the 21 states with licensure requirements . . . made 2 or 3 percent more than their
counterparts").
520. New Mexico recognized the issue of mobility with regard to military members and offers
has an expedited licensure in some of its licensing provisions for members of the military. See,
e.g., N.M. CODE R. § 16.10.2.17 (LexisNexis 2015) (providing expedited licensure for
occupational therapy).
521. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924); accord State v. Ballance, 51
S.E.2d 731, 735-36 (N.C. 1949) (taking photos in downtown Raleigh is not an occupation subject
to state regulation).
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principles of open government, procedural process, public participation, and
agency accountability.
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EDMISTEN
RALrIan
27602

3 May 1976

Mr. B.E. James
Executive Secretary
North Carolina State Bar
107 Fayetteville Street

Raleigh, North Carolina

27602

Dear Mr. James:
Attached hereto please find the letter which I did for you
sometime ago concerning the application of the Administrative
Procedure Act to the North Carolina State Bar.
This letter
was
circulated
among the three Senior Deputies and represents the
best
thinking of this
Office on the subject.
We will
be glad
to work with you in any way that
we can to determine what needs
to be filed
by the State Bar and how best
to go about putting
that
material in an appropriate form for filing.
Very truly
RUFUS
ATTO

yours,

EDMIST
Y GEN-JJ(

v. S. Crum
ssociate Attorney Gene al
DSC/ch
Enc.
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tALer of ortli Curolina
c)cpur-iltent of 3usoic.

EDMISTEN

Box 629
P. 0.
RALOOn
27602

3 May

1976

Mr. B.E. James
Executive Secretary
North Carolina State Bar
107 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina
27602
Dear Mr. James:
This is in response to your inquiry as to whether, and to what extent the North Carolina State Bar is subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act, Chapter 150A of the General Statutes.
The critical issue in determining whether the State Bar is subject
to the provisions of Chapter 150A is whether the Bar is .an "agency"
as that term is defined in the Act, G.S. 150A-2(l):
"Agency" means every agency, institution, board,
commission, bureau, department, division, council,
of the
member of the Council of State,. or officer
state government of the State of North Carolina
but does not include those agencies in the legislative or judicial branches of the state government;
In G.S. 84-15 the General Assembly declared, "there is hereby
the
created as an agency of the State of North Carolina, ...
It has nevertheless been suggested,
North Carolina State Bar."
because of the involvement of the Supreme Court in making rules
for the Bar, and because of the inherent powers of the court to
discipline members of the bar, that the Bar is exempt from Chapter
150A under the judicial exception to the definition of agency.
argument
After careful research and consideration, we find this
unpersuasive.
There are essentially two reasons for which we reject this argument.
hand in glove with the
reason is that
G.S. 84-15 fits
The first
That statutory
of "agency" contained in G.S. 15OA-2(l).
definition
for the
harmony does not, however, answer the question in full,
General Assembly and Supreme Court are "agencies of the State of
North Carolina,* and no one contends that they are subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act.
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The second reason is that the State Bar is created by an act of the
General Assembly, G.S. §84-15 to -38.
The Supreme Courts of other
states have accepted the argument:
The fundamental functions of the Court are the
administration of justice and the protection of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. To effectively
perform such functions, as well as its other ordinary
duties, it is essential that the Court have the assistance and cooperation of an able, vigorous, and honorable bar.
It follows that the Court has not only the
power, but the responsibility as well, to make any
reasonable order, rules, or regulations which will
aid in bringing this about, and that the making of
regulations and rules governing the legal profession
falls squarely within the judicial power thus exclusively reserved to the Court ...
Petition for Integration of Bar, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d
517 (1943).
The debates of the organizers of our Bar seem to indicate that they
believed that legislative action was required to organize the Bar,
see generally, Bryson, "The Organized Bar in North Carolina," 30
N.C.L. Rev. 335 (1952); Note, 11 N.C.L. Rev. 191 (1934).
Perhaps because the Bar was integrated by legislative act, perhaps
because our Supreme Court has always "recognized the power of the
legislature and the statutes enacted by it as the 'State's collected
will,'
"In re Ebbs, 150 N.C. 44, 63 SE 190 (1908), the consequences
which have attached to orders and statutes integrating the Bar in
other jurisdictions have not obtained here. Our Court, for example,
has never referred to the State Bar as "an arm of the court," Re
Edwards, 50 Idaho 238, 294 P. 847 (1930), nor has it ever held the
State Bar an agency of the court, Re uny, 202 La. 41, 11 So.2d
398 (1942), nor has our Court held the act integrating the Bar an
act necessarily only in aid of the inherent powers of the court,
Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943) . In fact,
our court has construed the provisions of G.S. 584-36 as providing
for the creation of two methods of attorney discipline; the one,
within the jurisdiction of the State Bar being statutory, and the
other, within the jurisdiction of the courts, judicial, In re Burton
257 N.C. 534, 126 SE2d 581 (1962); In re Gilliland, 248 N.C. 517,
103 SE2d 807 (1958); State v. Spivey 213 N.C. 45, 195 SE2d 1 (1937);
In re Ebbs, 150 N.C. 44, 63 SE 190 (1908);
In re Bonding Co., 16
N.C. App. 272, 192 SE2d 33 (1972). Thus, the Court does not treat
the integrated Bar as its own agency, but as an agency created by
act of the General Assembly;
in many respects no different from
licensing boards established for the regulation and discipline of
"medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, piloting, engineering, or any other
profession, calling or vocation [which] rests within the police
power of the General Assembly." In re Applicants, 143 N.C. 1, 55 SE
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635 (1906) . The Court has said that "questions of propriety and
ethics are ordinarily for the consideration of the North Carolina
dar,
Inc., . . ." Mclichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 91 S.E.2d 231
(1956) but has not required all questions of ethics and discipline
other than those which are the proper subjects of contempt, to be
referred to the Bar, as it might, if it regarded the Oar as its
own agency. Our Court, has in fact shown great deference to the
legislative power to regulate the practice of law and the discipline
of its practitioners, Ex Parte Moore, 63 N.C. 397 (1869) , Ex Parte
Biggs, 64 N.C. 202 (1870Y, Ex Parte Schenck, 65 N.C. 353 (1871)
Ex Parte Haywood, 66 N.C. 1 (1872).
Given these observations and
actions on the part of our Court, and given the primacy of the
General Assembly in establishing administrative agencies, we feel
compelled to conclude that the North Carolina State Bar is an
administrative.agency within the meaning of G.S. 150A-2(l).
G.S. 84-23 even begins with the words, "Subject to the superior
authority of the General Assembly to legislate thereon by general
law . . . the council is hereby vested, as an agency of the State."
The only objection to this conclusion of which we are aware is the.
role of the Supreme Court in the rule approval process. G.S. 84-21
provides:
Copies of all such rules and regulations adopted
subsequently to the filing of the certificate of
organization, and of all amendments so made by the
council, shall be certified to the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, entered by
it upon its minutes, and published in the next ensuing number of the North Carolina Reports: Provided
that the court may decline to have so entered upon
its minutes any of such rules, regulations and amendments which in the opinion of the Chief Justice are
inconsistent with this article.
blush, this objection to regarding the state Bar as an agency
At first
seems to be substantial. However, this objection we do not find
sufficient. The Supreme Court is not, by the terms of the statute,
has only
given any authority to make rules for the State Bar; it
Furthermore, this
a veto power over rules made by the council.
to give
Chief
Justice
allows
the
merely
somewhat unique procedure
an advance opinion on the subjects concerning which the Court could
make a decision, where the issue of the consistency of the administrative rules with the statute is raised in a proper proceeding.
Therefore, we conclude that the Supren Court is not sufficiently
involved with the State Bar to make the Bar an agency of the Court
rather than an agency which exercises its powers pursuant to legislative command, just as any other administrative agency.
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A final reason that the State Bar must be regarded as an administrative agency is found in Chapter 150A itself. G.S. 150A-l(b)
provides, "the purpose and intent of this Chapter is to establish
as nearly as possible a uniform system of administrative procedure
for State agencies." As noted at the outset, the definition of
"agency" is a broad one. In G.S. 150A-l(a) the General Assembly
provided specific exemptions from the provisions of the Chapter
for certain administrative agencies; the State Bar is not among
those the General Assembly provided an exemption.
G.S. 150A-l(a) provides, "[t]hi.; Chapter shall apply except to the
ro
y statute makes specif
extent and in the ariiculars that
(emphasis dded).The questontherefore
visions to the contrary."
arises, to what extent has the General Assembly enacted statute in
Chapter 84 making specific provisions to the contrary of Chapter 150A.
At the outset it is plain that the State Bar is exempt from the
provisions of Article 4 of Chapter 150A, entitled "Judicial Review."
G.S. 15OA-43 provides that the provisions of Article 4 apply "unless
adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by some other
In
statute, in which case the review is under such other statute."
G.S. 7A-29 the General Assembly has provided that final orders of
may
be
84-28
to
G.S.
made
pursuant
Bar
State
the North Carolina
appealed directly, as of right, to the Court of Appeals. Therefore,
it is plain that G.S. 7A-29 is "a statute making specific provisions
to the contrary" and a statute providing "adequate procedure for
judicial review" thus exempting the State Bar from the provisions
of Article 4.
Three provisions of Chapter 84 concern the rulemaking power of
the State Bar. These provisions are G.S. 84-21, G.S. 84-23 and
G.S. 84-23.1. G.S. 84-23 provides:
Subject to the superior authority of the General
Assembly to legislate thereon by general law, and
except as herein otherwise limited, the council
is hereby vested, as an agency of the State, with
the control of the discipline, disbarment and
restoration of attorneys practicing law in this
State. The council shall have power to administer
this Article; to formulate and adopt rules of
professional ethics and conduct; to formulate and
adopt rules and procedures for discipline, incapacity and disability hearings; to publish an official
journal concerning matters of interest to the legal
profession; and to do all such things necessary in
the furtherance of the purposes of this Article as
are not prohibited by law.

;
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G.S. 84-21 provides in relevant part:
A copy of the certificate of organization, as spread
upon the minutes of the Court, shall be published in
.the next ensuing volume of the North Carolina Reports.
The rules snd regulations set forth in the certificate
of organization, and all other rules and regulations
which may be adopted by the council under this Article,
may be amended by the council from time to time in any
matter not inconsistent with this Article. Copies of
all such rules and regulations adopted subsequently
to the filing of the certificate of organization, and
of all amendments so made by the council, shall be
certified to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, entered by it upon its minutes, and published in the next ensuing number of the North Carolina
Reports: Provided that the Court may decline to have
so entered upon its minutes any of such rules, regulations and amendments which in the opinion of the Chief
Justice are inconsistent with this Article.
G.S. 84-23.1 gives the council authority to approve certain plans
for prepaid legal services. G.S. 15OA-9 provides:
It is the intent of this Article to establish basic
minimum procedural requirements for the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of administrative rules ....
The provisions of this Article are applicable to the
exercises of any rulemaking authority conferred by
any statute, ... No rule hereafter adopted is valid
unless adopted in substantial compliance with this
Article.
These statutes read in pari materia tend, we think, to fortify the
conclusion that the North Carolina State Bar is subject to the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, because G.S. 15OA-9
provides that the Article shall apply "to the exercise of any rulemaking authority conferred by any statute". The referenced portions
of Chapter 84 plainly vest rulemaking authority and tell the Bar
what to do with the rules as formulated, but do not describe the
manner in which the rules are to be formulated.
Article 5 of Chapter 150A, the Registration of State Administrative
Rules Act, is closely related to Article 2, and many of the same considerations are involved in determining the necessity for compliance
with Article 5. We believe that the State Bar is subject to the requirements of Article 2 because it is an agency which exercises rulemakin
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authority.
G.S. 150A-59 requires that rules adopted by agencies
subject to the Act be filed with the Attorney General.
However,
an argument can be made that G.S. 84-21 is, in the language of
G.S. 150A-l(a) a "statute making specific provisions to the contrary," in that
it provides for the filing of the rules of the
system for
Since an alternate
State Bar with the Supreme Court.
by G.S. 84-21
of the rules of the State Bar is provided for
the filing
the penalty attaching to any
with certainty that
we cannot state
noncompliance of the State Bar with the filing
requirements of

Chapter 150A would necessazily be the invalidity of unfiled rules.
We believe,
especially
rules with
considered
It

the more conservative course to follow,
however, that
in light of G.S. 150A-59(c), is for the Bar to file its
the Attorney General's Office whether such filing be
required or permissive.

should be noted,

however, that

the definition

of "rule" in

G.5. 150A-10 is slightly different from the definition of "rule"
in G.S. 15OA-58, and that certain rules are required to be filed
Also
adoption.
which do not require rulemaking hearings for their
of "rule" for Article
because of the differences in the definition
some rules are required
2 and Article 5 purposes, it may be that

to be filed under the terms of Article 5 of Chapter 150A which are
not "rules" for the purposes of G.S. 84-21.

This leads us to a consideration of the application of Article 3
of the Act, concerning administrative hearings, to the State Bar.
any, of Article 3 on the council
A determination of the impact, if

and Grievance Committee disciplinary procedures requires detailed

analysis

of Article

3, of Chapter 84 and of the rules of the State

Bar concerning discipline, disability and incapacity procedures now
appearing in Article IX of the certificate of organization of the
State Bar.
G.S.

84-28(a)

provides:
Any attorney admitted to

practice

law in this

State

is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
council of the North Carolina State Bar under such
promulrules and procedures as the council shall
gate as provided in G.S. 84-21.
G.S. 84-28(g)
G.S. 84-28(b) sets forth certain causes for discipline.
provides for the transfer of an attorney to inactive status for
mental incompetence, or physical disability "under such rules and
procedures as the council shall promulgate as provided in G.S. 84-21."
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G.S. 84-28.1 establishes the Grievance Committee and authorizes it
to hold hearings in matters of discipline, incapacity and disability
matters. G.S. 84-29 gives to the council, the Grievance Committee,
the power to administer
or any committee of either certain powers:
oaths and affirmations, the power to subpoena, and the power to
direct the taking of depositions.
Careful examination of Chapter 84, the rules of the Bar relating
to disciplinary, disability and incapacity hearings, and Article 3
of Chapter 150A discloses that neither the rules nor Chapter 84
deal with the following subject matters which are dealt with in
Chapter 150A. G.S. 150A-23(d) provides:
Any person may petition to become a party by filing
a motion to intervene as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24.

_-

The rules of the Bar provide no procedure for intervention.

I

G.S. 150A-24 provides that when a hearing in a contested case is
conducted by less than a majority of an agency, the hearing is to
be conducted in the county where the person whose rights are the
subject matter of the hearing maintains his residence. The rules
of the State Bar do not appear to speak to the venue of the hearing,
Should the Grievance Committee exercise its
nor does Chater 84.
option to appoint a three person hearing committee to hear the
discipline case, then it would appear that G.S. 150A-24 would require the hearing to be conducted in the county where the attorney
to be disciplined maintains his residence. However, should the
Grievance Committee continue to hold hearings as a group of the
entire committee, hearings may be held in Wake County.
Just as the rules of the Bar do not provide for intervention in disciplinary proceedings, they also do not seem to provide for the
consolidation of cases as provided for in G.S. 150A-26.
Rule 14(17) provides that the rules of evidence applicable in the
Superior Courts of this State shall be followed in the conduct of
disciplinary hearings. G.S. 1SOA-29 would appear to give the Bar,
should it choose to exercise the option, the authority .to use
broader rules of evidence. That rule, however, probably is sufficiently broad to porvide for the committees' taking "official notice"
of any facts of which judicial notice might be taken, as provided
for in G.S. 150A-30.
These are the only .subject matters dealt with by the Administrative
Procedure Act concerning which there seems to be some imparallelism
between Article 3 of Chapter 150A, Chapter 84 and the rules of the Bar
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If we can be of any further assistance to you in the matter of the
Bar's compliance with Chapter 150A please do not hesitate to call
on us.
As members of the Bar we have not reached these conclusions
lightly.
After careful consideration, however, we believe that
these conclusions best allow us to discharge that obligation of our
oaths of office that we "will be faithful
and bear true allegiance
to the State of North Carolina and to the constitutional powers and
authorities which are or may be established for the government thereof."
Very truly yours,
RUFU
L'. EDMI
AT !NEY GEN

vid S.

EN

rup

Associate Attorney General
DSC/pm

[Vol. 45
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P.

of
0.

Box
RAL..So

Jush*
629

27002

August 30, .1976

Honorable J. William Copeland
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of North Carolina
2 East Morgan Street
27602
Raleigh, North Carolina
Dear Mr. Justice Copeland:
In the opinion of this office, the North Carolina State Bar
could be found to be exempt from Chapter 150A of the General
Statutes, the Administrative Procedure Act, as G.S. 150A-2(l)
excludes from the definition of "agency," "those agencies in
the . . . judicial branches of the state government."
Very truly yours,

Ruf
.Edmisten
Attorney General
RLE/ppb
cc:
-

Mr. David S. Crump
Associate Attorney

Administrative Procedures Section
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

;Icp

SEP 1976

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECIED

RALEIGH 27602

RronvENEN

September 1,

1976

*.4

BN.C.5r

The Honorable B. E. James
Executive Secretary
N. C. State Bar
107 Fayetteville Street

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Dear Mr. James:
In the opinion of this Office, the North Carolina
State Bar is found to be exempt from Chapter 150A of the
General Statutes for the 'reason that the Administrative
Procedure Act, 150A-2 (11 excludes from the definition of

agency "those agencies in the ...
judicial branches sof the
State Government", and in our opi b
o htiilina
arhoitk
State Bar "fs m
er" df the jqdi 41Axb an.

DMIt N
RUFUS. L
.Attorn jfteneral

Hoard A. K:
Deputy Attorney (eneral

for Legal Affairs

HAK/ds
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14 earb of %Iaiu 2xaminers
of The

of Xort 1 Carolina
July 14, 1977

6$tate

MEMBERS

EMERSO

P. DAMESON, CNAIRMaN

MARION. N. C. 28752

Honorable Rufus Edoisten
Attorney General of North Carolina
Department of Justice
Post Office Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

HORACE E. STACY, JR.
LUMA

N. C.

NH

2838

ROBRT C. HOWISON.

REAsH,

JR.

C. 27602

N.

Attention:
N. WILRSSe.

N. C. 28658

GEORGE H. MCNEIL
los R. IHm TH 5EV
MOREsu
CITY, N. C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:
26587

WALTER R. MOQUIRE

FIRS

NATIHC

USIOR

AHILL,

N.

UA

L.

C. 280t

FRANCIS 1. PARKER
ST.
301 g. McDowatI
CHARLOTTE, N. C. 2820A
ERIC C. MICHAUX

1-x ",ls.

-RC

N. C. 27702

D0H-.
JAMES

MAIL

S.

WILMINToN.

N.

C. 28400

FREE P. PARKER Ill
ERCUTIVE SECRETARY

This is to advise that the Board of Law Examiners is
withdrawing the rules filed with your office under the
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Board no longer considers itself subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.
This decision was made by the Board at a recent
meeting after considering your opinion letter to Mr. B, E.
James, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina State Bar,
dated September 1, 1976 which found that tite State Bar was
exempt from Chapter 150A of the General Statutes of North
Carolina and the order entered on the 20th day of December,
1976 by the Honorable Donald L. Smith, Judge of Wake County
Superior Court, in the case of MITCHINER v. BOARD OF LAW
EXAMINERS.

OALIOO. N. C. 27811

EMERITUS

Mr. Andrew A. Vanore, Jr.
Chief Deputy Attorney General

With best wishes

I am

MMAtR,

ARCH K. RCHOCH.

Very truly yours,

SR..
MIGH PRINT

THOMAS

CHARLES
J.

E.

H.

G.

LEATH,

TUCKER. N-

WILIAM

L. MIL,

17

ecutive Secretary

SUCK, AHVIL

SR
JR.,
CO

a7edefille $tret,

FPP/rab
cc: Mr. Emerson P.

fax

25427,

kigl,

ron

mth Claralina, 2711, ttlepinsz 919 828-4588
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July 27, 1977

-. ""Parker, III
1T ?t*f
Ex$
titve &scretary
The Board of Law zamiiners

of haS State otkit th tkliia
9PO.Bor2154 27
Raleigh,,North Catolihti 21611Doar Mr. Parker:
you for
o
This willii4kiovedg redt o'sdthank
Board
redthate
#o6 letter of 14 July 1977 *visog
of Law Examiners is withdrawiag the rules filed with my
Act, and that
office wider tAaisttativePredure
the Board no longer gonsiders itself subject to the
t
Administrative Procedue AMt.o
d-tdt 'y office on
In light ofrthpii±oil
thdttth iStattBar'wesiihnclda
1 September 1974
exwpt from Chapter l50A of the General Statutes of North
t r4tian of the Eoard of
dren
Carolina, I concur vtth the
44r xaminers.
With best 41iihe.i4

'iMn'

RUFUS L. BMISTE
RLE:js
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Received & Filed 04/1912012 Elaine
F Marsnall North Carolina NC
Secretary of State

Elle 19oadb of Lato C
of e) _
iltate of
MEMBERS

JAMES R

(ct'ottna

FILED

VAN CAW ,A:u

WLLIAM K

ortlj

PR 1 1 2012

DAVIS

sSEC

o
SOC
CIC
>IC C
LAESSM.NeC 255C.

April 17, 2012

tETARY OF STATE

ROY W DAVIS, JR.
AsatCLLC.

A C

2asc

SAMUEL S WoOOLEY JR.

The H-lonorable Elaine Marshall
Office of the Secretary of State
P.O. Box 29622
Raleigh, NC 27626

RANDEL E PHILLIPS
SOS

IYO2 SC2

LON.

JUDGE A. LEON STANBACK. JR.

Re:
JAYE P MEYER
-CLNN

N. C.

Notice of 2012 Official Meetings of the
Board of Law Examiners of the State of North Carolina

W

Dear Ms. Marshall:

R FEIsWMAN
C99 STONE N5TCCar
OCLEON. .. 0, 215
SETH

L. ASErN Q.

Please find below a listing of the dates of the official meetings ofthe
Board of Law Examiners of the State of North Carolina for the remainder
of 2012.

RURlIG

LBERLYA.
RERCK
5510W SN>CCSI.uAlCC
K

The Board holds its regular meetings each year in January, June and
October. Additionally, a business meeting is conducted during each bar
examination grading session, in March and August of each year.

REID I. PHILLIVS
FRED N PARKER Il
!EcuIriv D0RECTO0

WO&TOEECOS~oCxIN

For the remainder of 2012, the Board's regular meeting schedule will be
as follows:

LEEA VLAMOS
001u05GN

C.

278R

EMERITUS MEMBERS
HORACE E, STACY, JR. LUS2t!ATON
SOON D WARLECK. JR., JACsoCve
ERIC C. MICHACJK, ORMA.9
ARCH SCHOCH.
,SOaN EoinT
LNDA Nd. MCGEE. COvOLLA
WALTER F, 6RINKLEY, LsatWGON
RICHRNo S. JONES. JN., FRA0xt05
LILIAN 0 JORDAN, RANDLNI
CL-NTON
LLIE L.
ISAAC N NORTHUREJRRASSbTS.S
LLOYD F RACCOM. CH LorY
JOE L. WEBSTER, ErNT!spRR
GERALD R. COLUNS, JR. MPHYKAR ADKINS,
ROBIN TATUM CURRIN, ROtial
SUSAN FREYA OLNIE. U-RAM
CATHERINE E. THOMPSON CALOToE
GAIL C. ARNEKE. CRoKY MEUNT
EMIL F KRATT. CaLorE

S

POOLE,

Date

Location of Meeting

June 6-8. 2012

Board's Offices at One Exchange Plaza.
Suite 700
Raleigh, NC 27602

October 24-26. 2012

Board's Offices at One Exchange Plaza,
Suite 700
Raleigh, NC 27602

EWELOTTE

tuire

700, Onue

Seleptonei

39NIE0ge
2940,
0tata.
r-triaiti. _orti Ciaratina 27602
* fax
919-82S-2251

919-$2S-4886
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Additionally, a business meeting of the Board will be held during
the grading session for the July 2012 bar examination, between the
dates of August I 1-23, 2012 at an off-site location.
The Board of Law Examiners is authorized to investigate, examine
and determine the character and other qualifications of applicants
seeking admission to the North Carolina State Bar. During its
meetings, the Board discusses issues involved with preparing,
approving, administering and/or grading examinations and issues
dealing with confidential information relating to individual
applicants. As such, pursuant to NC.G.S. Section 143-318.18,
Article 33 of the General Statutes involving Meetings of Public
Bodies does not apply to the Board.
Moreover, confidential information which is not considered public
record within the meaning of Chapter 132 of the General Stannes, is
discussed during meetings of the Board. To prevent the disclosure
of such information, these meetings are closed, pursuant to N.C.G.S.
Section 143-318.1l(l).
If you have any questions, or need any additional information,
please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,

P. Parker. Ill
Executive Director

buitr 700, One Cvsrtssr 1tisa.a flx 2950, ilaiigoj, jqorb Carolina 27602

Zeleita 90-~26,48SG - fax 0104$2S-2251

